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Abstract
The New York Daiwa Bank scandal in 1995, which involved Daiwa
Bank's concealment of the $1.1 billion in losses from the illegal funding
of U.S. Treasury bonds, resulted in the most severe economic penalties
ever imposed by the United States on Japan. These penalties included
the termination of Daiwa Bank's U.S. operations and a substantiated
international distrust of Japanese financial institutions, including their
closely aligned governmental regulators, the Ministry of Finance.
In September 2000, a Japanese court handed down a decision in this
shareholders' representative action that ordered the defendants, twelve
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the University of Hawaii in August 1996. LL.B. 1960, Tokyo University; LL.M. 1964,
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directors of Daiwa Bank, to pay bank damages totaling $775 million
(approximately 82.9 billion yen). These damages ranged from $530
million (approximately 56.7 billion yen) to $70 million (approximately
7.5 billion yen) per person, and shocked the international society because
of the costly size of the penalties. The award raised many basic legal and
economic issues regarding the shareholders' representative action system
in Japan, which was first introduced to Japan by the U.S. in 1950. Due
to the importance of the Japanese economy in a global sense, the
system's behavior is expected to have a tremendous effect on the
international economic society. International communities are watching
closely whether the administrative, legal, and legislative arms of the
Japanese government as well as the private sectors can respond to the
enrichment and improvement of the shareholders' action system
enforcing responsibilities of directors.
The recent court decision regarding the shareholders' action was
quite meaningful in examining the duties assumed by the directors of a
financial institution, which require them to establish an internal control
system for controlling risks and adhering to laws and regulations,
differences in the duties of care among the directors, and the objects of
the responsibilities, as well as the scope of damages.
Also, the court decision sounded a very important alarm about how
Japanese corporations are managed. The background that allowed
Japanese companies to be run loosely seemed to be the fact that the
supervising authorities and the legal system failed to rigorously pursue
the lack of risk management and the concealment of responsibilities.
The present case served to reveal the fact that it is extremely
dangerous for Japanese financial institutions to try to operate overseas
without mending their looseness in risk management and their sloppiness
in legal compliance Japanese financial supervising authorities must
accept this new mind set. Another such an incident could invite
international mistrust in the Japanese society itself. The current status of
the legal and organizational systems of the Japanese financial
supervising authorities is not up to the level of handling international
financial businesses.
This lack of sternness in the law enforcement system has created
sloppy risk management and concealing attitudes among Japanese
companies, which resulted in the current case when one such Japanese
company operated in the U.S. with the same loose attitude. In order to
prevent this kind of case, more rigorous attitudes are necessary to ensure
that directors are more responsible for their duties. That should give the
proper incentive to Japanese companies to establish effective risk
management and law-abidance systems. It is notable that shareholders'
representative actions have finally started to function as an effective
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means of law enforcement in Japan.
In this article, the author compares the differing United States and
Japanese reactions to the New York Daiwa Bank scandal on legal,
economic, and sociological levels. Based on his analysis, the author
concludes that cultural differences between the United States and Japan
lie at the heart of the scandalous proportions of the Daiwa Bank incident
in New York. Furthermore, the author believes that the Daiwa Bank case
offers an important lesson for the U.S. and Japanese companies with
international operations: "When in Rome, do as the Romans do."
I. Introduction'
An incredible incident was disclosed in 1995 at Daiwa Bank's New
York branch: one of its employees had been illegally trading U.S.
Treasury bonds for over eleven years without detection, causing the bank
an accumulated loss of $1.1 billion. Since then, this incident
mushroomed into an international scandal, resulting in civil, criminal,
and administrative liabilities in both the United States and Japan. There
had never been an economic incident with such a tremendous
international impact between Japan and the United States.
The concerns about the incident expressed by the supervising
authorities of both countries, as well as by stakeholders, such as
corresponding foreign banks and the Bank's stockholders, resulted in
specific actions taken to manage the situation in its aftermath. Those
1. Editor's Note: As a service to our readers, the Editorial Board normally checks
cited material for both "Bluebook" form and substance. This article, however, relies
extensively on sources available only in Japanese, which were unable to be "source-
checked" in the traditional law review sense. The sources have been checked for
"Bluebook" form.
2. It was August 8, 1995 when the president, an executive vice president in charge
of international operations, and a managing director of Daiwa Bank met with the Director
General of the Banking Bureau of MOF at the bank's club to report an illegal incident. In
response, the Director General of the Banking Bureau told the representatives of the bank
that "it [was] bad timing[.]" as disclosure might trigger instability in financial circles, and
kept the secret in his pocket. It waited more than 40 days until September 18, 1995 when
the MOF finally notified the U.S. authorities. MOF'S Confusion at its Peak: Distrust of
Japan's Financial Administration Heightens Regarding Daiwa Bank Scandal.
Disbanding of MOF is Suggested, SHUKAN ToYo KEIZAI, Dec. 2, 1995, at 16. As an
example, a Wall Street Journal article stated:
The real rogue in Japan's [MOF]. In the Daiwa affair and in its handling of
Japan's banking crisis, the [MOF] has shown its remarkable overconfidence
and its willingness to bamboozle U.S. bank regulators, the Japanese public and
even itself. ... So maybe it wasn't surprising that the [MOF] thought it could
flout U.S. banking regulations this summer by failing to report-for six
weeks-what it had learned about Daiwa's illegal trades in the U.S. The trades
cost Daiwa $1.1 billion. But they cost the [MOF] its reputation.
John Bussey, Japan's Bungling Ministry of Finance, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1995, at A14.
Another example that is causing criticisms against the MOF from this perspective is
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actions, in return, caused further questions on both sides of the Pacific. It
seems that all these opinions, actions, and questions stem from the
differences in Japanese and American social systems and thought
patterns.3
Daiwa Bank (hereinafter Daiwa or the Bank) and the Ministry of
Finance (hereinafter MOF), the authority within the Japanese
government that supervises the Daiwa Bank, did not acknowledge any
fault in the matter despite the fact that the incident drew severe criticism
internationally and caused Japan to lose credibility in the finance
industry. Why? Is there really a difference in the legal systems of the
two countries that makes an act illegal in the United States and legal in
Japan? Are there any conceptual differences between the systems of the
two countries as to a corporation's responsibility for the disclosure of
important information regarding its performance?
In addition, the people of Japan had long accepted the mutually
supportive relationship between the Japanese government and Japanese
industry-often called the "convoy" system.5  The rest of the world,
however, had become more suspicious of this relationship.6
the "Jusen" problem. Although MOF claims that the interest-free preferential credits of
Japanese banks against Specialized Housing Finance Companies (Jusen) is Y40 trillion,
the actual figure is rumored to be Y70 trillion. The U.S. authorities are irritated that MOF
is not disclosing information in a straightforward manner and have the impression that
MOF is engaged in a cover up, as in the Daiwa Bank case. See Nippon Island of Bad
Debts, SHUKAN Toyo KEIZAI, Feb. 24, 1996, at 12-17. For "Jusen," see Mitsuru Misawa,
Lenders' Liability in the Japanese Financial Market; A case of 'Jusen,' the largest
problem loan in Japan, Part 1, 30 MGMT. JAPAN No. 2. 18-28 (Autumn 1997); and
Mitsuru Misawa, Lenders' Liability in the Japanese Financial Market, A case of "Jusen,'
the largest problem loan in Japan, Part 11, 31 MNGT. JAPAN No. 1, 18-28 (Spring 1998).
3. The MOF has tried rebutting this criticism regarding the delayed report on
various occasions. While the MOF is trying to convince the world by saying "there is
nothing to be concerned about in the financial system," it has taken actions which
indicate that it is deeply concerned by the loss of its credibility. For example, after the
announcement of the affair, MOF showed keen interests in how it was perceived by
overseas observers as exemplified by the Deputy Vice-Minister holding an explanatory
meeting in Washington D.C., and the special press conference held by General Directors
of Banking Business and International Finance Bureau with foreign correspondents in
Tokyo. See Outlandishness of Japanese Financial System Revealed: MOF Agonizes as
its Rebuttals are Ignored, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct 18, 1995, at. 3.
4. SHUKAN ToYo KEIZAI, supra note 2.
5. The treatment of Japanese banks by MOF is best understood by an analogy to a
convoy forming a large group consisting of warships, cruisers, and destroyers to ride out
rough seas and opposition.
6. In the Senate Banking Committee's hearing on the Daiwa Bank incident, Mr.
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) said about MOF's delay
in reporting to the U.S. Authorities that "it is regretful that MOF made this error," while
Chairman of the Banking Committee, Senator D'Amato criticized MOF saying, "MOF,
which prevented the speedy report to the U.S. authorities in a collusion with Daiwa,
severely damaged the trust between the two governments." MOF's Failures are
Regrettable, NIHON KEIZAI StMBuN, Nov. 29, 1995, at 2.
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Accordingly, the Daiwa incident caused the MOF to lose its credibility as
a competent authority in the eyes of international observers. 7 Is such a
relationship unacceptable in international society? Does MOF need an
overhaul?
Furthermore, Japan disapproved of retaliatory steps taken by the
United States.8 For instance, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board (hereinafter
FRB) ordered Daiwa Bank to cease its operations in the United States.9
Some in Japan considered this action to be too severe. 10 What caused
this decision by the FRB? What were the legal grounds for it?
In 1995, Daiwa's stockholders brought a representative action
against the Bank regarding this incident. 1" A Japanese court made a
decision in this shareholder's representative action in September 2000.12
It ordered the defendants, twelve directors of Daiwa Bank, to pay to the
bank damages totaling $775 million (approximately 82.9 billion yen),
which ranged from $530 million (approximately 56.7 billion yen) to $70
million (approximately 7.5 billion yen) per person; the amount of the
damages shocked international society. The case raised many basic
issues regarding the shareholder's representative action system in
Japan. 13 Due to the importance of the Japanese economy to the overall
world economy, the Japanese legal system's behavior is expected to have
a tremendous effect on the international economic society, with
international communities watching closely to see whether the
7. After Japan acknowledged that it had failed to notify American banking
authorities for six weeks after it learned of a $1.1 billion scandal at the Daiwa Bank in
New York. Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin and his Japanese counterpart, Masayoshi
Takemura, talked on October 11, 1995 to air their differences. Rubin's aides said that
officials of Japan's MOF characterized the conversation as an apology, but Japanese
officials said in Tokyo on October 12 that no apology had been offered. See Cloistered
Japanese Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at Al.
8. The MOF has tried rebutting this criticism regarding the delayed report on
various occasions. While MOF is trying to convince the world by saying "there is
nothing to be concerned about in the financial system," it has taken actions which
indicate that it is deeply concerned by the loss of its credibility. For example, after the
announcement of the affair, MOF showed keen interests in how it was perceived by
overseas observers as exemplified by the Deputy Vice-Minister holding an explanatory
meeting in Washington D.C., and the special press conference held by General Directors
of Banking Business and International Finance Bureau with foreign correspondents in
Tokyo). See Outlandishness of Japanese Financial System Revealed: MOF Agonizes as
its Rebuttals are Ignored, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 18, 1995, at 3.
9. Osaka District Court, Sept. 20, 2000, Shoji Homu, No. 1573, at 4-51 [hereinafter
Court Decision]. (All the parts of the court judgment cited in this article are translated to
English by the author.)
10. U.S. Intensifies Criticism Against MOF: MOF Should Not Discuss Its Role,
SHUKAN ToYo KEIZAI, Dec. 2, 1995, at 22 [hereinafter U.S. Intensifies Criticism].
11. Kaisha ni Taisuru Sekinin (Responsibilities to Company), Commercial Code
Law No. 48 of 1899, art 266-1-5 [hereinafter Kaisha ni Taisuru Senkini].
12. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
13. id.
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administrative, legal and legislative arms of the Japanese government can
respond to the enrichment and improvement of the system. 14
The shareholder's derivative action system originally was
introduced under the influence of the U.S. system as a part of the
revision of the Commercial Code 15 in 1950 but it took a long time to
implement because its characteristics were rather exotic to the Japanese
culture. The future of the shareholder's derivative action system,
including the adequacy of the recent court decision on the Daiwa Bank,
also was being discussed thoroughly by the international community. 16
The case involved a locally hired employee of the New York branch
of a Japanese bank, a Japanese American, and attracted a lot of
international media attention, due to its international nature. 17  More
specifically, the related shareholders' representative action was drawing
the attention of U.S. corporations (more particularly U.S. banks)
operating in Japan, as the case was indicative of a potential risk. It was
assumed that there were many U.S. international lawyers who were
sought out for advice concerning the responsibilities of directors in
Japan. 8 The intention of this article is to clarify for these attorneys and
the rest of the legal community the problems that are caused by the
differences between Japan and the U.S.
The recent court decision was meaningful in examining the duties
assumed by directors of financial institutions which required them to
establish an internal control system for controlling risks and abiding by
laws and regulations, deciphering the differences in the duties of care
among the directors, interpreting the meaning of the "laws" in Section 1-
5, Article 266 of the Commercial Code, and the objects of the
responsibilities in said section as well as the scope of its damages.' 9
There is still room for doubt in this court decision as to whether
sufficient examination has been made as to the judgment on identifying
specific negligence. The instant case presents legislative questions such
14. Id. at 35.
15. Commerical Code Law No. 48 of 1899.
16. Hiroshi Okuda, Chairman of Japan Business Federation, is reported to have
commented concerning this court decision that "I believe it is better if people refrain from
filing shareholder's representative actions." NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 21, 2000, at 3.
Reporting the court decision, newspapers generally pointed out the problem of secretive
atmosphere of the Japanese financial communities and their lack of responsibilities
through their editorials and objected the modification of the law claiming that the
revision is intended to make the law ineffectual using this court decision as a reason.
Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 21, 2000, at 2.
17. See infra notes 7, 8, 242, and 244.
18. Id.
19. See Kimura Toshio, Management Responsibility in the Daiwa Bank Case (in
Japanese), JAPAN BusINEss NEWS, at http://www.japan-bus.pwc.com/ins-
sol/business/bushoLpre2001 .html.
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as whether it is reasonable to order a director to pay the full amount of
damages when the damages amount to an enormous sum, or possible to
set an upper limit to damages, or even to pardon the responsibility of the
defendant. In Part I, the article will outline the case, examine these
various issues, and study the meaning of the present case, simultaneously
examining the goals for which the shareholder's representative action
system should aim. In order to do so, the article will also study various
cases of shareholder's representative action in Japan, which preceded the
present case to clarify the importance of the present case. The article
will also discuss the basic issues between the financial institutions and
the financial administration of the government concerning international
financial business, issues which became evident by the instant case.
This case contains a broad range of complex issues, encompassing
the government and business circles of Japan and the U.S. Therefore, the
method of analysis for these issues requires an extensive multi-
disciplinary approach based on jurisprudential, economical, sociological,
and international comparative studies. This article seeks to provide such
a multi-disciplinary analysis.
In Part II, this article discusses past suits and the subsequent
standards of directors' liability and applies this standard to the Daiwa
Bank suit. Part III of this article reviews the factual background of the
Daiwa Bank case. Part IV, reviews the court decision of the recent
Daiwa Bank shareholder's suit. Part V, examines the legal actions taken
against the Daiwa Bank by the United States and suggests that such
actions fall within the general trend of increased supervision by U.S.
authorities over foreign banks. Part VI explains and reviews the
meanings and issues of derivative action against Daiwa Bank. Part VII
compares and contrasts the duty of disclosure under United States and
Japanese law. It also discusses the reporting responsibilities of the MOF.
Part VIII of this article points out the other effects of the court decision
on the shareholder's derivative action.
Finally, the article concludes that both autonomous responsibility
principles and free market doctrine are necessary to further Japanese
banking in the international market and that further improvement of the
relations between the Unites States and Japan requires a consensus
regarding international business. This article further concludes that the
Daiwa Bank court decision on the shareholder's derivative action should
be considered an alarm, warning against the way Japanese corporations
are managed. The case points out the background that allowed Japanese
companies to be run loosely seems to be in the fact that the supervising
authorities and the legal system failed to rigorously pursue the looseness
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
of risk management and concealing of responsibilities.2 °
II. Stockholder's Derivative Suits in Japan
The stockholders' representative action is a rather new form of
litigation introduced in the United States in 1950, which has not
functioned properly in Japan.21 While the number of stockholders'
representative actions is increasing and several judgments have been
made in cases where the directors' responsibilities were at issue, it is too
early to say that the system operating such actions has been well
established. The Daiwa Bank case drew much attention from
international business circles due to the size of the claim, and will be a
leading case in the future. However, examination of a few other typical
cases is proper and appears below.
A. Case A: Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd.
In a stockholders' representative action, the directors of Mitsui
Mining Co., Ltd.22 were sued for damages caused by having to coerce its
wholly owned subsidiary into purchasing its stock at a high price and
then selling the stock to the Mitsui Group at a lower price. The suit
alleges that this action violated the rule prohibiting the acquisition of a
company's own stock. The Supreme Court, finding that the acquisition
of the stock of their own company was a violation of the Commercial
Code,23 rendered a guilty verdict against the directors.24 Although this
representative action requested the payment of Y100 billion
(approximately $1 billion), the Supreme Court supported the judgment of
the Second Tokyo High Court that found Y3.5 billion (approximately
20. This article is a continuation of an older article, Mitsuru Misawa, Daiwa Bank
Scandal in New York-It's Causes, Significance, and Lessons in the International
Society, 29 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1023 (1996). For the various development of this
case since its disclosure in September 1995 to November 1996, please read that article.
21. In order to make this system function properly, a revision of the Commercial
Code was enacted in October 1993 containing: (1) a reduction of the petition fee and
(2) allowing plaintiff stockholders to petition for recovery of litigation expenses from the
company if the plaintiffs win. Amendments to the Commercial Code, June 14, 1993, No.
62.
22. A mining concern listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
23. According to the Commercial Code at that time, a company was prohibited from
acquiring its own stocks. Jiko Kabushiki no Shutoko [Acquisition of Own Stock] art.
210. Also, a subsidiary is prohibited from acquiring the stocks of its parent company.
The rule recognizes the oneness of the parent company and a subsidiary and applies the
rule to the transaction between the two. Jiko Kabushiki no Shutoku [Acquisition of Own
Stock] art. 211-2. However, a company is allowed to acquire its own stocks by the
revision of the Treasury Shares portion of the Commercial Code in 2001.
24. Ariyoshi v. Mitsui Mining Co., 1400, Ist Small Court. 1989, (Sup. Ct., Sept. 9,
1993).
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$350 million) in damages.25
B. Case B: Hazama Gumi Ltd.
In a representative action requesting damages from a director of
Hazama-gumi Ltd.,26 for a bribe paid to the mayor of Sanwamachi,
Ibaragi-ken by the company, the Tokyo District Court rendered a guilty
verdict in December 1994 .27 The verdict against the directors ordered
them to pay ¥14 million (approximately $140,000) in damages, a sum
equal to the amount of the bribery.28 In delivering the verdict, the Tokyo
District Court ruled that: (1) using as a means of business a crime of a
highly unsocial nature, such as bribery, should not be tolerated; and
(2) bribery cannot be justified as a means of business simply because it
brings a profit to the company, it is difficult to get an order without it (as
competitors do the same), or it is customary in the industry. 29 The
defendants did not appeal the case.
C. Case C: Nomura Securities
Before loss compensation procedures became illegal by the
Revision of 1991 of the Securities and Exchange Law,30 Nomura
Securities3' compensated such losses.32  In a representative action
seeking damages against the directors, the Tokyo High Court supported
the decision of the first trial by the Tokyo District Court, which did not
hold the directors liable and rejected the claim by the plaintiff.3 3 While it
found that loss compensation is an unfair trading method in violation of
the Antimonopoly Law,34 it also decided that the Antimonopoly Law
may conflict with the rules that apply the Commercial Code with regard
to damage caused by a violation of the directors. 35 The reason for this is
25. Tokyo District Court, May 29, 1986, Harei Jihyo, No. 1194 at 33; Shoji Homu,
No. 1078 at 43; and Tokyo High Court, July 3, 1988, Shoji Homu, No. 1188 at 36.
26. A general construction company listed at Tokyo Stock Exchange.
27. Matsumaru v. Otsu, Tokyo District Court, Dec. 22, 1994, Civil Sec. No. 8, 1993
(wa) No. 18447.
28. No. 153 Diet Record (Justice Committee, No. 13), Nov. 27, 2001 (in Japanese),
at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdbjkaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku!0004153200
11127013.htm.
29. Id.
30. Commercial Code Law No. 25 of 1948.
31. A securities broker listed at Tokyo Stock Exchange.
32. See Mitsuru Misawa, Loss Compensation in the Japanese Securities Market:
Causes, Significance, and Search for a Remedy, 25 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37-58 (1992)
(discussing loss compensation).
33. Ikenaga v. Tabuchi, Tokyo High Court, Sept. 26, 1995, 16 th Civil Dept., 1993
(ne) No. 3778 [hereinafter Ikenaga].
34. Commercial Code Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 19.
35. Kaisha ni Taisuru, supra note 11, at art. 266-1-5.
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that the party that receives the loss is not the company, but the
competitor.36 The decision also stated that the loss compensation was
within the normal boundaries of the management's judgment, and neither
the violation of the duty of due care nor the violation of the duty of
loyalty to the company were found.37 Thus, the directors were not liable.
D. Standard of Directors' Liability
The facts of these three example representative actions are
completely different. By comparing these three decisions, however, one
can deduce the following standard of directors' liability.
First, as the decision of the Tokyo District Court stated in Nomura
Securities: (1) the management judgment of a corporation is a
comprehensive one requiring a professional, predictive, policy-making
judgment capability for analyzing unpredictable, fluid, and complex
factors, so that it tends to be broad and complex; and (2) a court should
examine the actual management judgment of the directors itself from the
standpoint of whether there were any careless mistakes in examining the
facts that were used as premises, and whether the decision-making
process based on the facts was not illogical.38 In essence, it seems that
the court is trying to honor the business judgment of directors as much as
possible.
The court, however, considered that directors might be subject to
liability in certain situations. First, even if an act may be viewed as
indispensable for business reasons, the director who committed the act
may still be punished if it is an illegal act for which a person can be sent
to jail.39 In the above three cases, bribery can be a criminal offense
punishable by up to three years of imprisonment under a Criminal
Code,40 and acquisition of one's own company stock can be a criminal
offense punishable by up to five years of imprisonment under the
Commercial Code.4 1 On the other hand, loss compensation conducted
before 1991 is not a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment, and
42no penalty rules are applicable to violations of the Antimonopoly Law.
Second, assuming that an act is not a criminal offense, directors will
not be punished simply because they caused a loss to the company, if
36. See Misawa, supra note 32.
37. Tokyo District Court, Dec. 22, 1994, Civil Sec. No. 8., 1993 (wa) No. 18447.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Zouwai, Assen Zouwai (Bribery, Mediating Bribery), Commerical Code Law
No. 45 of 1907, art. 198.
41. Kaisha Zaisan wo Ayauku suru Tsumi (Crime to Risk Company's Assets),
Commercial Code Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 489-2.
42. See Misawa, supra note 32 (discussing the illegality of loss compensation).
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other directors in the same industry could have made the same mistake.43
Third, a director who performs a certain prohibited act or fails to
supervise another such a director, a director or auditor who attended the
board of directors meeting where the execution plan for such an act was
adopted, or an auditor who attended the auditors meeting which
examined such a plan, may be liable. 44
E. Application of Old Standards to the Daiwa Bank Case
These principles should be applied when reviewing the Daiwa Bank
case. In light of the first principle, if the court in New York decides that
the action of the directors stationed at the New York Branch at the time
of the incident is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment then the
same directors will be held liable in the representative action in Japan as
well. According to the third principle, not only the directors who
actually performed the actions, but also the directors who failed to
monitor the directors who performed the actions, as well as the directors
and auditors who attended the board meeting at which the action was
approved, face liability.
If such action is not a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment,
it should then be examined through the second principle.45 In other
words, if the action of the director that caused a loss to the company is
the type of action that would have been performed by many directors in
the same industry, the director is not liable.46 The question is whether
the action performed by the directors stationed at the New York Branch
can be considered to be the kind of action that would have been
performed by many directors in the same industry. The answer to that
question is no; the present case is a very unusual case in view of the
common sense of the particular industry. Therefore, it is likely that the
directors will be held liable, even if the action does not constitute a
criminal offense punishable by imprisonment.
In addition, in the Daiwa Bank case, responsibilities of the directors
will be evaluated from new perspectives. For example, is it reasonable to
impose supervisory liability on the directors, who resided in Japan at the
time, when the incident occurred in New York? The general sentiment
of Japanese managers is that "directors who reside in Japan cannot be
held responsible for an incident that happened at a place so far away. 47
43. Tokyo District Court, supra note 37.
44. Misawa supra note 32.
45. See e.g., Mitsuo Kondo and Toshiaki Hasegawa, et. al., Various Issues of
Shareholder's Suit in Japan, YoBoU JIHYO, Summer 2001, at 26-35.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Even though it happened on foreign soil, it may still be reasonable for the
stockholders to hold the directors who resided in Japan responsible for a
breach of supervisory duty because of the extensive length of time-
eleven years-that they remained unaware of what was happening.
The Japanese should welcome the opportunity brought by the
judgment in the present case to think about the responsibilities of
directors in the expanding international environment and to clarify these
standards of responsibilities.
III. Factual Background of the Daiwa Bank Case in New York
Daiwa Bank48 disclosed on September 26, 1995, that a Bank Vice-
President Toshihide Iguchi,49 who was in charge of securities trading and
control at its New York Branch, had been selling securities that the Bank
had in its custody to cover up the loss created by his own unauthorized,
unlisted trading of U.S. Treasury bonds. 50  His trading caused Gush's
bank to lose a total of approximately $1.1 billion (approximately Y1 10
billion).5' Iguchi's cover up consisted of the concealment of transaction
certificates.52 The amount of Daiwa's loss is among the highest in the
history of similar known cases.53
Although the loss in this case was caused by the criminal conduct of
an individual, the multiple review of transaction, one of the basic rules
for all financial institutions did not work in this case. It is astonishing
that this illegal trading remained undetected for eleven years. 54 Thus, it
is important to see how it was concealed.55
When a bank trades U.S. Treasury Bonds, securities companies-
the bank's counterpart in the transactions-normally send transaction
48. Daiwa Bank was the 17t ' largest bank in 1995 in the world with about $318
billion in assets and more than 9,000 employees. The corporation stock was listed in the
Tokyo Stock Exchange. Established in 1918 its main office was located at 2-1 Bingo-
Machi, 2-Chome, Chuo-ku, Osaka-shi, Osaka Japan. TOKYO KEIZAI JAPAN COMPANY
HANDBOOK 1100 (1996).
49. On September 26, 1995, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) arrested
Toshihide Iguchi (age 44), a former employee of Daiwa Bank's New York Branch. See
Daiwa Bank's Huge Loss, 30,000 Unauthorized Transactions: FBI Announces Arrest of
Daiwa Bank's Former Employee, NIHON KEIzAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 27, 1995, at 1.
50. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 5.
51. Id.
52. See Yoshiyuki Watanabe, Daiwa Bank Conceals Wrongdoings, BUNGEI SHUNJU,
Dec. 1995, at 94-104 (outlining details of the concealment by Daiwa Bank).
53. Misawa, supra note 20.
54. The incident became known to the management of the bank through Iguchi's
confession letter dated July 24, 1995 and addressed to the president. For details of the
confession letter, see Exclusive Publication of Defendant Toshihide Iguchi 's Confession,
BUNGEI SHuNJU, Jan. 1996, 112-31.
55. Id.
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confirmation statements to the transaction control section of the bank.56
Iguchi, however, instructed the securities companies to send those
statements directly to him.57 He also hid the true securities balance
statements sent from custodial banks, which held the traded Treasury
bonds and delivered forged statements to the custodial control section of
the Bank.5
How could this happen? First, Iguchi was in charge of both
securities trading and securities control. Second, he held these positions
in the section that traded Treasury bonds for eleven years. It is quite
unusual, even among Japanese banks, for an employee to remain
essentially in one position for such a long period. Third, although it is
customary for bank employees in the United States and Europe to take a
long vacation once a year while another employee handles his or her
job.59 Iguchi never took any long vacations during the eleven-year
period. Finally, with regard to market risk management, it is customary
for Japanese banks to set up a trading limit for each trader.6 ° In this case,
however, the Bank failed to detect the loss, which substantially exceeded
the capacity of its New York Branch.61 While it is granted that the loss
was covered up by unlisted or out-of-books transactions, the
management's responsibility for the lack of more effective and stringent
control is indisputable.
In 1995, certain stockholders62 brought suit in the District Court of
Osaka claiming $1.1 billion (Y1 10 billion) in damages, caused by the loss
at the New York Branch of Daiwa Bank, against 49 defendants,
including the former chairman of the board, former officers, and the
current president and officers of the Bank.63 The Bank's stockholders
originally requested that Daiwa Bank's auditor initiate an action against
the management of the Bank within thirty days, but the auditor refused to
do so.64 As a result, those stockholders decided to sue the Bank's
directors themselves in accordance with the Commercial Code.65
In this shareholder's representative action, plaintiffs P1 and P2 as
well as a participant S claimed the defendants D1 through D16, D28
through D30, and D 32 through D 49 , all of whom were directors or auditors
56. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 5.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Tokyo District Court, supra note 25.
60. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 8.
61. Id.
62. Two individual stockholders and one corporation stockholder.
63. Stockholders Representative Action to be Filed Tomorrow Asking 1.1 Billion
Dollars in Damages, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 26, 1995, at 30.
64. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 8.
65. Kaisha ni Taisuru Senkini, supra note 11, arts. 267, 275-74.
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of Daiwa Bank, should pay damages in a sum of $1.1 billion, claiming
that those defendants caused a loss of $1.1 billion to Daiwa Bank,
wherein the representative directors and the directors who served as the
New York branch managers during the period relevant to the case for
failing to perform their duties of care and loyalty as good managers by
failing to establish a control system for preventing misconducts of
employees and minimizing damages that can be caused by such
misconducts ("internal control system").66  In addition, the other
directors and auditors failed to perform their duties of care and loyalty
for checking to see if said representative directors, and said directors who
served as the New York branch managers established the internal control
system, and thus failed to prevent the present case.67 This is "case A."
The court granted only a portion of the damages for D2 for case A.6 8
After the case was disclosed to the public, Daiwa Bank became the
target of a criminal prosecution,69 primarily on the grounds that it failed
to report to the Federal Government the incurred loss of approximately
$1.1 billion related to the case.70 They ended up admitting guilt for 16
counts and paid the penalty of $340 million.7' In a shareholder's
representative action, P1, P2, and S claimed that the defendants D,
through D32 violated their duty of care and loyalty as directors or auditors
of the bank, causing a loss of $340 million in penalties plus a lawyer's
fee of $10 million, for a total of $350 million and that D1 through D 32
should pay the damages.72 This is "case B."
The plaintiffs claimed that, of the counts to which the defendants
admitted guilt, counts 14 through 20 directly were related to the fact that
the representative directors and the directors who served as the New
York branch managers during the concerned period failed to fulfill their
duty of care and loyalty for establishing an internal control system, while
other directors and auditors failed to check if the internal control system
was established by the representative directors and the directors who
served as the New York branch managers. 3 Thus, all of them prevented
the non-party Iguchi from making false statements in various documents
that constituted those counts.74 Counts 1 through 7, 23 and 24 were
related to the performance of the directors, who served as the New York
branch managers during the concerned period, and who performed in
66. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 8.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 47.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 8.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 10.
74. Id.
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breach of the U.S. law and violated of their duties of care and loyalty as a
good manager. These counts also related to the fact that other directors'
and auditors' failure to check if the representative directors and the
directors who served as the New York branch managers were observing
the pertinent U.S. laws. This was the violation of their duties of care and
loyalty. The failure eventually led to the parties being unable to prevent
the accused wrong-doing. 75 The court provided a decision allowing only
a part of the claims against the defendants D1 through D4, D6 through
DIo, and D 27 as to case B.76
IV. The Court Decision for the Daiwa Bank Shareholders' Suit in 2002
First, looking into the facts of the case admitted into the court for
the decision, it is noted that on July 18, 1995, Iguchi sent a letter
confessing his unauthorized dealings to a defendant D1, the president of
Daiwa Bank, and D1 received it on July 24.7  Upon receiving it, D1
immediately disclosed the letter to a defendant D2 (vice president), 78 a
defendant D3 (vice president),79 a defendant D4 (the chairman of the
board and a former president), 80 a defendant D5 (director in charge of
general affairs and human resources), 8 1 a defendant D6 (director and the
international department manager as well as a former New York branch
manager),82 and a defendant D7 (director in charge of planning,
accounting and securities departments).8 3 Incidentally, Daiwa Bank
issued 50 million shares of preferred stocks on July 27, 1995 without
publicly disclosing the incident.84
Meanwhile, D1 instructed D2, D6, and D3, who was the New York
branch manager at that time, to investigate the incident secretly.85 While
they came to realize the facts of the matter, D, instructed those
investigators to keep it secret.86 Accordingly, on July 31, a defendant D 8
filed a false call report to the U.S. Treasury Department, reporting that
the Treasury bills (T-bills) sold without authorization existed as a
property of the New York branch of the Bank.8 7 D6 either instructed or
75. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 8.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 30.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 8.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 8.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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knew about this report, and both D, and D 2 acknowledged it, at least after
the fact.1
8
On August 8, 1995, DI, D2, D6, D9, and D10 met with the Director-
General of the Banking Bureau and the Director of the Commercial
Banks Division of the Ministry of Finance to report the outline of the
case and their plan on how to handle the matter, asking the Ministry's
opinions on how the case should be disclosed to the public. 89 The
Director-General of the Banking Bureau stated that the coming
September would be the worst time to disclose it considering the
financial situation of Japan and requested that bank representatives hold
the information in tight security to prevent any leakage. 90
In late August 1995, in consideration of an opinion from the
department in charge of the U.S. operation that there were strict
regulations in the U.S.,91 D, instructed D6 to consult with a U.S. lawyer
about the specific regulations of related U.S. laws. 92 In accordance with
the instruction, D6 reported to D1, D2, D7, D9, and D10 that Daiwa Bank
legally was obligated to report the case to the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB) and the State of New York Banking Department.93 Upon
receiving this report, D, decided to report the matter to the FRB in mid-
September and reported that decision to the Director of the Commercial
Banks Division of the Ministry of Finance.94 On September 18, D2
reported the case to the Vice Chairman of the FRB and the
Superintendent of Banks of the New York Banking Department. 95
D1 disclosed the matter at the board meeting held on September 25
1995, at which time all 13 defendants, D14 through D26 (directors), came
to know about the case for the first time.96 Three defendants Dll through
D13 (representative directors) learned about the case in a management
meeting held on September 7.97 On September 26, a disclosure of the
case was made also to three defendants D28 through D 30 (standing
auditors) as well as to two defendants D 31 and D32 (non-standing auditors
or outside auditors), whereupon D, attended a news conference to
disclose the matter, essentially making a public announcement of the
case on the same day.98
88. Id.
89. Id. at 31.
90. Court Decision, supra note 9 at 31.
91. Id. at 32.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 33-34.
94. Id.
95. Court Decision, supra note 9 at 33-34.
96. Id. at 8.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Based upon these facts, the claims were partially granted by the
court and the results were as follows:
A. Issue I (Whether Nonfeasance Existed Regarding Duties of
Establishing an Internal Control System)
According to the Commercial Code,99 decisions are made by the
board of directors and are required for performing important business of
a corporation. 00 The outline of the internal control system'0 ' that
touches on the basics of corporate management,'0 2 needs to be
determined by the board of directors and representative directors, as well
as the director who was in charge of a concerned business unit and had
the duty to lay out a risk management system based on the provided
outline.'0 3
The abovementioned constitutes the contents of the duties of care
and loyalty for directors as good managers. Auditors, on the other hand,
have a duty to monitor, to check whether the directors were operating
conscientiously and refurbishing the risk management system as
needed.
10 4
However, the contents of the risk management system to be
installed became enriched as knowledge was gained from various cases
and accidents and research on risk management advanced. 0 5 Therefore,
it was not appropriate to use the current level of the risk management
system required at this point as the judgment standard for the present
case. 10 6 Moreover, it was a matter of judgment by management to decide
what kind of risk management system refurbishing should be made so
that there was wide latitude of decision making ability provided to
directors who were essentially corporation management specialists.'0 7
Directors have duties to establish a law abiding system in order to
prevent employees from engaging in illegal conduct while doing their
jobs, which also constitutes their duties of care and loyalty as
directors.108 Refurbishment of a system for controlling operation risks
also means refurbishing of a law-abiding system.10 9
The procedures for checking the storage balance of T-bills adopted
99. Commercial Code Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 260-2.
100. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 36-41.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 36-41.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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by the headquarters of Daiwa Bank (inspection department), l° the New
York Branch, and the accounting auditor employed by the bank were
extremely inadequate.' To check the balance, it was mandatory to use a
method appropriate for the nature of securities in storage; in other words,
it was necessary to check actual securities. 1
2
An in-shop inspection was conducted using the inspection
department's standards, which were based on the inspection rule
prepared by the inspection department and approved by the director in
charge of the inspection department. 113 Since the on-site inspection was
executed strictly in accordance with the above-mentioned inspection
rule, the director in charge of the inspection department was then
responsible for negligence in performing his job as an employee/director
because the method of checking the storage balance of T-bills was still
deemed inadequate. 1 4 Moreover, since the in-shop inspection and the
audit performed by the person in charge of internal auditing were
conducted under the supervision of the New York branch manager, the
director who happened to be the branch manager at that period was also
negligent in his job performance. 15 Consequently, the three defendants
D2, D6, and D8 who served as New York mangers at different, but
inclusive points in time pertinent to the case, were also negligent. 1
6
In a large, dynamic corporation such as Daiwa Bank, the president
or vice presidents were allowed to delegate some of their jobs to
directors." 7  In doing so, the presidents and vice presidents were
generally relieved of supervisory responsibilities, with the exception of
special circumstances. 18 There were no claims made in the action as to
such special circumstances. 19
Directors who were not involved in the chain of command within
the inspection department or the New York branch (including the
representative directors) have the responsibility of monitoring whether
the risk management system was properly established.FN However, it
was unreasonable to claim that the risk management system was not
outlined properly, nor was its specific structure clear, which made it
difficult to blame those directors for being negligent in their monitoring
of proper inspection methods.
110. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 36-41.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 36-41.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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The auditors, irrespective of whether they were standing or non-
standing, internal or external, except those auditors who actually
attended the check by the accounting auditors, are assumed to have been
unaware of any problems associated with the method of checking the
balance, clearing them of any liability.
The defendant D 33, who visited the New York branch for inspection
in September 1993, should have found that the method used by the
accounting auditors to confirm the storage balance of T-bills was
inappropriate, yet failed to acknowledge and correct it. This failure to
act made the defendant liable.
1 20
B. Issue 2 (Whether Nonfeasance Existed Regarding Duties
Concerning the Violations of US Laws)
The Commercial Code obligates directors of corporations, as a basis
of corporation management, to abide by applicable laws, laws not only of
Japan but also of foreign countries, if a corporation operates overseas.1
2
'
Abiding by laws of foreign countries is indeed within the jurisdiction of a
director's duty as a good manager.
The FRB required New York branches of foreign banks to report to
the United States Secret Service when they had any doubts about
potential criminal activities of their employees and if the suspect matters
required immediate action.122 Such reports of suspect matters could be
done via emergency telephone calls, followed by written reports
submitted within 30 days of the initial report. 123 In violation of this
obligation, D1, who was the representative director of Daiwa Bank,
caused others to call the FRB to report the fraudulent contents and entries
on the books and records of its New York branch, 124 while concealing the
facts from the U.S. authorities and failing to file the criminal report
within the period required by the law.
125
It was quite unconceivable that the defendants of the case B were
unaware of the unlawfulness of intentionally calling to report fraudulent
contents to the FRB. It was not difficult to assume that they at least
knew the generalities of the U.S. laws and regulations concerning those
reports and filings. It also was quite reasonable to conclude that they
intended deceitfully represent themselves to the FRB.
The act of D6 (New York branch manager) was a violation of the
120. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 36-41.
121. Commercial Code Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 266-1-5.
122. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41-47.
123. 12 C.F.R. § 208.20 (1996).
124. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41-47.
125. Id.
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United States Code and was considered to be a violation of the director's
duty of care as a good manager.
126
D2 (general manager of the American operations department at the
main office) did not commit the acts in question, but he could have
prevented then from being executed.'27 Therefore, he was considered to
have violated the director's duties of care and loyalty as a good
manager.1
28
D4, upon hearing about the report from D1, should have urged the
representative directors to file the report to the U.S. authorities. He also
could have prevented the call to report the fraudulent contents.
Therefore, he also was considered to have violated the director's duties
of care and loyalty as a good manager.
D, (representative director & president), D2 (representative director
& vice president in charge of intemational operations), and D3
(representative director & general manager of the international
department) failed to report to the U.S. authorities while knowing about
the unauthorized transactions. 129 As to the filing of the call report of the
fraudulent contents, it can only be assumed that they either gave explicit
instructions or approved for the fraudulent call, but it is surely known
that they failed to prevent it, thus constituting violations of supervising
duties as the superiors in the chain of command. This kind of conduct
clearly was a violation of the United States Code13 0 and is considered a
violation of the director's duties of care and loyalty as a good manager.
D3 (representative director & vice president), D9 (representative
director), D5 (representative director), and D7 (representative director)
failed to report to the US authorities while they were aware of the
unauthorized transactions. 13 They could have prevented such an act.' 32
Therefore, they were considered to have violated the directors' duties of
care and loyalty as good managers.' 33
D10 and D27 were aware of the unauthorized trading of this case, and
they should have urged the representative directors to report to the US
authorities.134  Therefore, they were considered to have violated the
directors' duties of care and loyalty as good managers.135
D8 (New York branch manager) failed to report to the U.S.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41-47.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41-47.
135. Id.
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authorities despite having full knowledge of the unauthorized trading of
this case.' 36 He also committed the crimes of filing a call report of
fraudulent contents to the FBI and made false entries into the books and
records of the New York branch, both of which were violations of the
United States Code. 137 He was then considered to have violated the
director's duties of care and loyalty as a good manager. 138
The three defendants, D11 through D13, came to know about the
unauthorized dealings after the fact and circumstances have not proven
that they could have previously known the facts of the crime.
39
Therefore, they could not be accused of any violations of the directors'
duties of care and loyalty as good managers.
40
The thirteen director defendants, D14 through D26, came to know
about the unauthorized dealings after the fact--on the day before the
case was made public-and the five auditors-defendants, D28 through
D32, received the report about the case on the day everything was made
public. 14' All those defendants who were informed of the case after the
fact could not be held liable for any violations of the directors' duties of
care and loyalty as good managers. 142
A director generally was given a wide range of discretionary power
in executing his/her job. 43 Therefore, in order to bring up a charge
against a director challenging past business decisions as being made in
violation of his/her duties of care and loyalty, the challenger must bring
proof of a material and negligent error as the basis of the director's
decision. 144 However, the discretionary power of a director did not go
beyond the boundary of applicable laws and a director was not given the
authority to judge whether or not his/her business decisions violated
laws, in particular, laws of foreign countries.1
45
The defendants of the case B claimed that there were no expectation
probabilities for reporting unauthorized dealings with the U.S. authorities
against the wish or suggestion of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).146
However, no evidence was filed with the court to prove that the MOF
instructed or ordered D, et al. not to report the matter to the U.S.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41-47.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 4147.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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authorities.147
The defendants of case B claim that they were not aware of the rules
and regulations of the United States involving banks, but the claim could
not be justified. 148 If it is assumed that they were not fully aware of the
details of the relevant rules and regulations of the United States, they
should have immediately investigated and studied the appropriate rules
and regulations of the United States no matter how rare and unusual the
case. As managers of a corporation conducting business in the United
States, this was critical. Instead, they failed to take any action until such
time that they received a suggestion from the department in charge of the
particular operation. 149 The investigation was obviously too late and
inexcusable; an inevitable circumstance that stems from ignorance of the
rules and regulations.
As can be seen from the above, D1, et al. made an extremely
unreasonable and inappropriate business decision as the business
managers, overlooking the severe condition Daiwa Bank was facing. It
then is reasonable to say that they violated the directors' duties of care
and loyalty as good managers.
C. Issue 3 (Existence and Scope of Damage)
1. Case A
(1) D2
The defendant was not responsible for the damages that were
already incurred when he arrived in New York as the branch manager.1 50
Therefore, he is liable for repaying the damages, which are
conservatively estimated to be approximately $570 million of the total
damages of approximately $1.1 billion. 15
(2) D6, D 7
It was unclear if the damages occurred after either of them assumed
the position of the branch manager, and no evidence had been filed to the
court to prove that the damages were incurred because either of them
neglected their duties.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41-47.
150. Id. at 47-49.
151. Id.
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(3) D 23
It was unclear if the damages occurred after he conducted a survey
of the branch, and no evidence had been filed to the court to prove that
the damages occurred because he neglected his duties.
2. Case B
The defendants of the case B claimed that the plaintiffs' claimed
that the defendants of the case B were negligent in the establishment of a
risk management system had no causal relation with the result that
Daiwa Bank, a corporation, paid a penalty.1
5 2
However, if the New York branch had adopted an appropriate
inspection method, 153 Iguchi's act that corresponded to the counts 14
through 20 could have been prevented,' 54 and resultantly Daiwa Bank
could not have been punished with the penalty, so that it was reasonable
to assume a legal causal relation.'55
(1) D4, Di, D8, D 7
Since the guilty pleas of this case, which were the causes of the
penalty that consisted of sixteen counts (and the defendants D 4 et al. were
liable only for seven of them), 56 it was not reasonable to ask D 4 et al. to
be responsible for repaying the damages equivalent to the sum of the
penalty and the legal fee. 157  It was more reasonable to make a
proportionate distribution of causal relation based on their individual
contribution to the case.
58
It was reasonable to have each of the defendants bear the payment
responsibility up to the limitation of $105 million, which was the most
conservative estimate, i.e., 30% of said sum of the penalty and the
lawyer's fee, $350 million. 159
(2) D2, D 6
Based on the same reasoning, these defendants were liable to pay up
to the limitation of $204 million, which was the most conservative
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41-47.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41-47.
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estimate, i.e., seventy percent of $350 million. 160
(3) D9 , D10, D27
Based on the same reasoning, these defendants were liable to pay up
to the limitation of $70 million, which was the most conservative
estimate, i.e., twenty percent of $350 million. 161
(4) D8
Based on the same reasoning, the defendant was liable to pay up to
the limitation of $157.5 million, which was the most conservative
estimate, i.e., fourty-five percent of $350 million. 162
V. U.S. Administrative Legal Actions Against Daiwa Bank in 1995
To understand the background of the court decision for this
shareholders' derivative suit, it is necessary to review how the U.S.
administrative legal actions were made against Daiwa Bank, that took
place before this court decision. 63 On November 2, 1995, the FRB
ordered Daiwa Bank to close its branches and terminate all operations in
the United States within ninety days.' 6 4 Moreover, for the next three
years, Daiwa Bank was obligated to submit a petition in writing if either
the Bank or its affiliates wished to reopen operations in the United
States. 65 This petition was then subject to the discretionary control of
U.S. authorities. 66 In practical terms, this meant that Daiwa Bank had
been completely banished from the United States. 67 This action by U.S.
authorities was viewed as an "abnormally" severe punishment in
Japan. 168 This article next examines whether this Japanese claim had any
merit by reviewing the legal grounds of the FRB's action and the
judgment that resulted from it.
According to the International Banking Act (IBA), 169 there were two
grounds on which FRB could base its decision of the deportation of
Daiwa Bank. First, Daiwa Bank did not obey the supervision of
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
164. Senjin Kishi, Fault of MOF Which Betrayed World and Japan: Japan Financial
Administration. Far Apart From Anglo-Saxon Logic, ECONOMIST (Japan), Dec. 5, 1995,
at 40-42.
165. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
166. Kishi, supra note 164.
167. U.S. Intensifies Criticism, supra note 10, at 22.
168. Id.
169. 12 U.S.C. § 611 (1994).
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regulation of the MOF. 170 Since Daiwa Bank had been consulting with
the MOF, it was unlikely that this was the reason for the FRB's decision.
It is better to assume that the FRB's action was based on the second
reason: Daiwa Bank's operations included those that could be considered
unsafe and unsound banking practices. 
171
First, Daiwa Bank violated the law that imposes certain reporting
obligations. Daiwa Bank failed to file a criminal referral report within
thirty days after the date of detection, the period defined in Regulation
H. 172 It seems inconceivable, however, that the FRB decided to expel
Daiwa Bank permanently from the U.S. solely on the grounds that the
Bank violated this reporting rule. The punishment for a violation of the
170. See §§ 7(e) and 10(b) of the International Banking Act, added in 1991 as
amendments.
The Board may order a foreign bank to terminate the activities of such branch,
agency, or subsidiary, if the Board finds that-
(A) the foreign bank is not subject to comprehensive supervision or
regulation on a consolidated basis by the appropriate authorities in its
home country; or
(B)(1) there is reasonable cause to believe that such a foreign bank or any
affiliate of such foreign bank, has committed a violation of law or engaged
in an unsafe or unsound banking practice in the United States; and as a
result of such violation or practice, the continued operation of the foreign
bank's branch, agency, or commercial lending company subsidiary in the
United States would not be consistent with the public interest or with the
purposes of this Act, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 or the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
Id. [hereinafter IBA §§ 7(e) and 10(b)]. See also 12 U.S.C. § 3107(b) (1994).
And in case of termination of a Federal branch of agency:
The Board may transmit to the Comptroller of the Currency a recommendation
that the license of any Federal branch or Federal agency of a foreign bank be
terminated in accordance with section 4(1) [12 U.S.C. § 3102(1)] if the Board
has reasonable cause to believe that such foreign bank or any affiliate of such
foreign bank has engaged in conduct for which the activities of any State
branch or agency may be terminated.
12 U.S.C. § 2105(e)(5) (1994).
171. Id.
172. 12 C.F.R. § 208.20 (1996). Id.
A state member bank shall file a criminal referral report.. . in every situation
where the State member bank suspects one of its directors, officers, employees,
agents, or other institution-affiliated parties of having committed or aided in the
commission of a crime.... A state member bank shall file the report... no
later than 30 calendar days after the date of detection of the loss or the known
or suspected criminal violation or activity. If no suspect has been identified
within 30 calendar days after the date of detection of the loss, or the known,
attempted, or suspected criminal violation or activity, reporting may be delayed
an additional 30 calendar days or until a suspect has been identified; but in no
case shall reporting of known or suspected crimes be delayed more than 60
calendar days after the date of detection of the loss or known, attempted, or
suspected criminal violation or activity. When a report requirement is triggered
by the identification of a suspect or group of suspects, the reporting period
commences with the identification of each suspect or group of suspects.
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reporting duty alone should entail, at most, a fine imposed on the Bank
or a criminal penalty against the individual(s) involved. 173
In addition to the reporting rule violation mentioned above, Daiwa
Bank committed two additional violations. 174  The Bank had been
making false reports to the authorities for the past eleven years in order
to conceal the unlawful trading. 75 In addition, it continued to conceal
these facts of this situation after management received Iguchi's
confession. 76 The Bank conducted a systematic concealment operation
regarding the loss generated by Daiwa Bank Trust, the subsidiary of the
Daiwa Bank.17 7 It is assumed that when the FRB discovered these two
violations, in addition to the reporting rule violation, it concluded that the
Bank had been conducting an "unsafe and unsound banking practice."'
178
As the backdrop of the FRB's decision is the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI) case. 179  BCCI was notorious for its
173. Id.
Any foreign bank or any office or subsidiary of a foreign bank, that-
(A) fails to make, submit, or publish such reports or information as may be
required under this Act or under regulations prescribed by the Board or the
Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to this Act, within the time period
specified by such agency; or
(B) submits or publishes any false or misleading report or information...
shall be subject to a penalty of not more than $20,000 for each day during
which such failure continues or such false or misleading information is not
corrected.
See also 12 U.S.C. § 3110(c) (1994).
Whoever, with the intent to deceive, to gain financially, or to cause financial
gain or loss to any person, knowingly violates any provision of this Act or any
regulation or order issued by the appropriate Federal banking agency under this
Act shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years or fined not more than
$1,000,000 for each day during which a violation continues, or both.
174. Per the complaint of the U.S. prosecution authorities. See Former N.Y. Branch
Manager Claimed Not Guilty: Defendants Lawyers of Daiwa Bank Case Claim Main
Case Itself is Illegitimate as Well, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 22, 1995, at 4
[hereinafter Former N. Y Branch Manager].
175. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
176. Former N. Y Branch Manager, supra note 174.
177. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
178. Former N. Y Branch Manager, supra note 174.
179. The BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International) group is a multinational
group of financial institutions having 365 offices in sixty-nine countries around the world
and was one of the largest Arabian financial institutions. A Pakistani businessman
established the BCCI GROUP in 1972 and the largest group stockholders consist of the
Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the people related to its government. BCCI Holding, the
holding company of the BCCI group, has a token head office in Luxembourg for the
purpose of registration and the actual head office in London. See generally BCCI Case's
Full Picture: Other Countries Responses and Developments in Japan, KINYU HOHMU
JiJYoU [Financial and Legal Affairs], Nov. 25, 1991 at 4-12 (hereinafter BCC[ Case's
Full Picture].
The BCCI group had been suspected of drug money laundering for some time. Id.
When its performance deteriorated due to failures of loans without collateral as well as
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underground activities, such as drug money laundering, and was called
"the world's dirtiest bank."' 8° In 1991, British authorities ordered BCCI
to stop its operations, which practically forced BCCI into bankruptcy.'
8
'
In the United States, authorities found that BCCI was illegally lending to
one if the nation's largest banks, Washington, D.C.-based First American
Bank. 182 As a result, the United States fined BCCI $200 million and
permanently expelled nine people involved in the case from banking in
the U.S.' 83
In contrast to the Daiwa Bank case, however, U.S. authorities did no
take expulsion actions were taken against BCCI itself by U.S. authorities.
BCCI, however, stopped its operations on its own initiative and retreated
from the United States. 84 From the FRB's standpoint, the most serious
violation by BCCI was the false report it made to U.S. authorities when it
purchased First American Bank. 185 As a result of this incident, a revision
of the IBA was introduced in 1991 to enhance the FRB's authority
substantially, giving it powers such as canceling licenses and examining
all foreign bank branches in the United States.'
86
The FRB's order, directed at Daiwa Bank to terminate operations,
was the first action of its kind taken by the FRB since the revision of the
IBA in 1991.187 While some people thought that this action was too
severe, it was neither unusual nor unduly harsh, if one understood the
trend toward increased supervision by U.S. authorities over foreign
banks.
188
dealing failures, it covered up its settlements with window dressing. Id.
On July 5, 1991, having been convicted of BCCI's long term window dressing
settlement practices, Bank of England, in coordination with the financial authorities of
the United States (where First American Bank, its subsidiary in a practical sense, exists),
ordered BCCI to halt its operation and froze its assets in each country in order to prevent
its customers' run on the bank and the insiders from hiding its assets. Id.
180. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See BCCI Case's Full Picture, supra note 179.
184. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
185. Id.
186. See IBA §§ 7(e) and 10(b), supra note 170.
187. Kishi, supra note 164; U.S. Intensifies Criticism, supra note 10.
188. Id.
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VI. Meanings and Issues of Derivative Action Against Daiwa Bank in
2002
A. Responsibilities of Directors Concerning Violations of US Laws
1. Meaning of "Laws" in Article 266, Section 1-5 of Commercial
Code 8 9
The court's decision to hold Daiwa Bank liable for damages totaling
$350 million, including the penalty and the lawyers' fees, demonstrates
that the defendants D, et al. were responsible as directors of a
corporation operating overseas by setting up branches and liaison offices.
As such, the defendants had a have duties of care as good managers to
obey the laws of the country where they were operating.1 90 As a
consequence, this case created a precedent, which now includes foreign
"laws" that are applicable to overseas branches within Article 266,
189. Article 266 of the Commercial Code provides:
1. In the following cases, directors who have done any one of the acts
mentioned there shall be jointly and severely liable in effecting performance or
in damages to the company, in the case of item (1) for the amount which has
been distributed or divided legally, in the. case of item (2) for the amount of
loans not yet repaid, or in the cases of items (3) to (5) inclusive for the amount
of any damage caused to the company:
(1) Where they have submitted to a general meeting the proposal for the
distribution of profits in contravention of the provision of Article 290
paragraph 1, or they have distributed money in contravention of the
provision of Article 293-5 paragraph 3;
(2) Where they have loaned money to another director;
(3) Where they have effected any transaction in contravention of the
provision of the Article 264 paragraph 1;
(4) Where they have effected any transaction mentioned in the preceding
Article;
(5) Where they have done any act, which violates any law or ordinance or
the articles of incorporation.
2. In cases where any act mentioned in the preceding paragraph has been done
in accordance with the resolution of the board of directors, the directors who
have assented to such resolution shall be deemed to have done such act.
3. The directors who have participated in the resolution mentioned in the
preceding paragraph and who have not expressed their dissent in the minutes
shall be presumed to have assented to such resolution.
4. The liability if directors mentioned in paragraph 1 cannot be released except
by the unanimous consent of all the shareholders.
5. The liability of directors in respect of the transaction mentioned in item (4)
of paragraph 1 may be released by majority of two-thirds or more of the votes
of the total number of the issued shares, notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding paragraph. In this case, the directors shall show all material facts as
to such transaction at a general meeting of shareholders.
190. The present decision by the court indicated 12 U.S.C. § 208.20 as a specific law
violated by D1 et al.
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Section 1-5 of the Commercial Law.' 91
The understanding of the "laws" has a plurality of theories in Japan.
The first is a recent decision made by the Supreme Court on a case of the
shareholder's representative action regarding Nomura Securities' loss
compensation, which indicated that the "laws" include all regulations of
the Commercial Law and other laws that are to be obeyed by a company
in conducting its business using the company as the addressee. 192 Japan
considers this decision by the Supreme Court as the majority theory in
Japan for the moment. This indicates that the understanding of the
"laws" is based on the idea that companies have law-abiding obligations
and the directors' adherence to these laws that specify the company as
the addressee in the course of their job executions, belong to their job-
related duties for the company.
93
The second theory only includes within the "laws" the regulations
of the Commercial Law (essentially a substantive corporate law) and
regulations that cover public policies for corporate directors.
Consideration for all other laws suffices if those laws are considered
from the standpoint of whether a decision causes any violation of the
director's duty of care.1
94
The third theory defines "laws" as those laws that directly or
indirectly try to maintain the soundness of the asset of a company.
95
Violations of any other laws matter only from the standpoint of liabilities
to damages.' 
96
Despite the differences between these three theories, they do share a
common ground. All three require companies operating overseas,
through establishing branches, to abide by the local laws.
2. Principle of Respondent Superior
The question about the present court decision has been questioned
because it presumes that the law concerning the defendants'
responsibilities is Article 266, Section 1-5 of the Commercial Code. It is
questioned because a common theory in Japan in regard to a
shareholder's representative action is that the entire liability of a director
to the company, not just the responsibility according to Article 266 of the
191. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 15.
192. Supreme Court decision, July 7, 2000; K1NYU/SHOJI HANREI
[FINANCIAL/COMMERCIAL PRECEDENCE], 1096, at 3 (2002).
193. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 15.
194. Mitsuo Kondo, Torishimariyaku no Keieijo no Kashitsu to Kaisha nitaisuru
Sekinin [Directors' Errors in Management and Their Responsibilities for Company]
KINYu FoMu Jijo [Financial Legal Situations], 1372, at 10.
195. SHIGERU MORIMOTO, KAISHAHO KOGI [CoRPoRATE LAW] 253 (2nd edition, 2001)
196. Id.
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Commercial Code, can be the target of a shareholders' action. In case of
(employee/director who happened to be the New York branch manager),
for example, there can be a view that his responsibility as an employer
being the New York branch manager was prosecuted.
In November 1995, D 3, the former New York Branch general
manager of Daiwa Bank was arrested and indicted in Federal District
Court of the Southern District of New York as being guilty of misprision
of felony. 197 Also the allegations were made against the Bank as a
corporation of misprision of felony and obstruction of the examination of
the financial institution by the authorities.'
98
While the prosecutor alleged that Daiwa Bank was liable under
respondeat superior for the damages its customers and the U.S. financial
authorities suffered due to illegal transactions, Daiwa Bank alleged that
the case was a personal wrongdoing committed by defendant Iguchi, and
that "the bank was a victim and was not responsible for the
misconduct."' 99
The disparity between Japanese and U.S. laws regarding respondeat
superior, caused a difference of opinion between U.S. authorities and
Daiwa Bank in this case. According to common law principle operating
in the United States, an employer was held liable for the conduct of its
employee that results in damages to third parties during the course of his
or her employment, regardless of whether or not the employer was at
fault.200 According to Japanese law, an employer was liable only when
the employer was negligent in the selection and supervision of the
employee. 20' However, Japanese law placed more responsibility on the
employer in its interpretation of an employee's course of employment.20 2
Daiwa Bank agreed in 1996 to plea bargain with the prosecutor to
settle the case by admitting some wrongdoing and paying a penalty.20 3 It
admitted wrongdoings as to sixteen of the allegations. Most notably
were the intentional concealment and conspiracy regarding a loss, which
were regarded as the center of the accusations. 20 4 Daiwa Bank paid $350
197. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 6.
198. Former N. Y Branch Manager, supra note 174, at 4.
199. See Daiwa Bank Has Employer's Responsibility: Federal Prosecutor's Rebuttal
Stresses Legitimacy of Accusation, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Feb. 13, 1996, at 3.
200. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 6.
201. Id.
202. Japanese Civil Code, Law No. 89 of 1898; Law No. 9 of 1898, art. 715.
203. See generally Daiwa Bank Seeks Judicial Settlement, Admits Huge Loss and
Conspiracy: Federal Prosecutor Charges $35.6 Billion Penalty for 16 Accounts
Including Delayed Report: Affected by MOF's Intention, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Feb.
29, 1996, at 1 (giving the details of the plea bargain agreement) [hereinafter Daiwa Bank
Seeks Judicial Settlement].
204. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 6-7.
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million in penalties. 20 5 However, since plea-bargaining does not exist
under Japanese law there had been some strong criticism in Japanese
economic circles of this mode of settlement by Daiwa Bank, arguing that
the bank should have fought to the end to clarify its role in the matter.20 6
3. Negligence Concerning Recognition of Illegality
D, et al. claimed that they were unaware of the contents of the laws
and regulations about banks in the U.S. 207 However the existence of case
law made this argument illogical.2 °8 Therefore, the issue regarding Dl et
al. became whether they were aware of the applicable U.S. laws and
regulations and whether there was a negligent act if they were unaware
of them.
Ultimately, the court decision rendered it unthinkable that the
defendants were unaware of the fact that it is illegal to file a report of
fraudulent contents to the FRB. 20 9  However, doubt remained about
whether each defendant was aware of the specific law or regulation of
the U.S. that prohibited the act. It was possible to assume that the
defendants were not so knowledgeable because things they received U.S.
legal consultation only after they heard from the department in charge of
the U.S. operation. The reality was that many of Japanese financial
institutions were unaware of the U.S. laws and the fact that their law-
abiding systems were inadequate.210 Similarly, some American bankers
were only vaguely aware of the banking law requirements, along with
their punishments. Thus, it was likely that D, et al. were not well aware
of the applicable laws and regulations in the U.S.
211
The question then was whether we could conclude that the
defendants were aware of the possible violation, or at least they were
negligent, if they had some notion that they could be pursued for
violation of some laws. If we were to assume a position that the
defendants could not be judged as having been negligent unless they
were cognizant of violation of specific laws, 2 12 it would be necessary to
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 42.
208. Misawa, supra note 2.
209. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 42.
210. See Brian P. Volkman, The Global Convergence of Bank Regulations and
Standards for Compliance, 115 BANKING L.J. 550, 554 (1998).
211. If Daiwa Bank concealed a fact of unauthorized dealings from the Japanese
authorities in charge of overseeing banking activities, the penalties such as $350 million,
or approximately ¥37 billion, which was charged in the U.S. is inconceivable in Japan. If
a bank files a fraudulent report to the Financial Reestablishment Commission, the penalty
is less than Y3 million in Japan. Banking Law of Japan, art. 63, § 1.
212. Tokyo High Court Decision, February 23, 1999; see also SHOUJI HOuMU
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make a more finite fact recognition of whether they were required to take
immediate action (i.e. such as contacting a local U.S. law office even
under the circumstance they were facing, or comparing their case with
those of American bank managers). It was a case where recognition that
their action could be illegal, or at least negligent, was a possiblity.
In November 1995, in Federal District Court of the Southern
District of New York, Daiwa Bank itself and D 3, the former director and
general manager of the New York Branch admitted their guilt regarding
a number of the charges and agreed to a plea bargain with the U.S.
prosecutor.213 The plaintiffs in the stockholders' representative action
used this plea bargain as indisputable evidence showing that they had
knowledge that their actions constituted a wrongful action.214
4. Claim of "Management Decision"
Rather than debate the existence or lack of a malfeasance, the
defendants claimed that the "management decision" was correct at the
time of the incident.21 5 In other words, the defendants argued whether
the response of the directors to the incidents was "extremely
unreasonable."
For this point, the present court decision stated a general theory that
a director's responsibility was pursuable only when either a material or
negligent error existed in the recognition of a fact which became the
premise of the director's judgment at the time of taking the particular
business measure, or the decision-making processes or its contents were
particularly unreasonable or inappropriate, considering the fact that a
director was given a wide range of discretionary power in making a
management decision.21 6 If this was compared to the leading case of the
management decision principle, the general theory of the management
decision principle in the verdict of the first hearing in the case of the
shareholder's representative action regarding Nomura Securities' loss
compensation,217 the decision was notable in that it said it was possible to
seek the directors' responsibilities not only on the decision-making
processes, but also on the contents if they were unreasonable or
inappropriate. However, the court found D1 et al. responsible without
applying this principle, noting that the discretionary power given to a
(BUSINESS LAW AFFAIRS) 192, at 164-168 (explaining that it is necessary to prove the
recognition or possibility of recognition of specific illegality in order for a director's
liability for damages to be established).
213. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 6.
214. Id. at 17.
215. Id. at 45.
216. Id.
217. Ikenaga, supra note 33.
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director was limited to a range that does not violate any laws,218 and in
particular, that the director was not given any discretionary power to
judge if a decision abides by a foreign law or not.21 9
It was true that a sufficient amount of precedence existed to support
the ruling that the management decision principle was not applicable to
illegal actions out of malice even in the United States where the
management decision principle was born. Additionally, there was no
argument about it in Japan.22 ° It went without saying that a director
could not evade responsibility if the director engaged in an action that
was knowingly illegal, judging from the notion that the "laws" of Article
266, Section 1-5 included any laws that were applicable to the
company.22I Therefore, it would be difficult to apply the management
decision principle if there was at least some recognition that the action
could be illegal.
However, if DI et al. had no notion of illegality, and there was only
a possibility of negligence, the management decision principle could be
an issue. In that case, a close examination would be required to
determine if there were any material and negligent error existed in the
recognition of the fact which was the preamble of the judgment by D1 et
al., or if there was any mismatch in the decision making processes and
contents. There was a high probability that DI et al. at least were
cognizant that their action could be illegal.
222
5. Intervention of MOF (Expectation Probability)
DI et al. also claimed that there was no expectation probability for
reporting to the US authorities against the MOF's request or
suggestion.223 In fact, Daiwa Bank seemed to have thought that it was
adequate to report the incident to the MOF and simply to obey the
guidance of the MOF.224 The MOF, however, did not tell Daiwa Bank
what to do in this case.225 Thus, Daiwa Bank inadvertently broke the
IBA's reporting rule that an incident has to be reported within thirty days
after it was discovered.226
A detailed analysis of the above is provided below, since it contains
218. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 45.
219. Id.
220. TAKASHI MAEDA, HANSETSU SHOUJI HouMU (COMMERCIAL LAW) 154, at 28-31.
221. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 46.
222. See Daiwa Bank Seeks Judicial Settlement, supra note 203 (explaining
recognition of illegality.
223. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 31.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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extremely important factors in understanding the background of the
present case such as special relations between the government and
civilian sectors and the difference of cultures between Japan and U.S.
22 7
Aside from focusing on the attempts by Daiwa Bank to hide losses,
U.S. criticism had also targeted the closed-room administrative practices
of the MOF.228 Such criticism arose from the MOF's failure to notify
U.S. financial authorities for six weeks after the MOF received its report
from Daiwa Bank. 22 9 These numerous criticisms suggested that the MOF
was really at fault in the matter rather than Daiwa Bank since it failed to
follow necessary procedures after receiving the report from the Bank.2 3°
As mentioned above, Daiwa Bank was "obligated to report to the
FRB within 30 days after the criminal case was suspected," according to
Regulation H.231 While the MOF's reporting duty does not stem directly
from this law, it should have advised Daiwa Bank to report to the
FRB.232 The MOF is accused of being morally responsible for this
233
nonfeasance. Moreover, even though there was no legal regulation to
abide by, the MOF should have inferred from the purpose of the law that
they had a responsibility to report this kind of information quickly to the
FRB.
As for this implicit responsibility for the nonfeasance of the
MOF,234 there was a strong view among the informed sources in the
Japanese financial world that the MOF did not know about this thirty-day
disclosure duty under the U.S. IBA.235 However, the FRB and U.S.
prosecutors did not think that this was true.236  This reporting
requirement was created based on the experience of the BCCI affair,
227. See supra text accompanying note 8.
228. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 2.
230. Id.
231. See supra note 173.
232. Suggestion for Disbanding of MOF Surfaced Abruptly with Daiwa Bank Sandal,
SHUKAN Toyo KEiZAI, Dec. 2, 1995, at 12.
233. Id.
234. The attitude taken by MOF in this case is a violation of the agreement among the
banking supervisory agencies of various national governments established to control
international banking transactions. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum
Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border
Establishments, July 1992, http://riskinstitute.ch/139290.htm.
When BBCI went bankrupt, the Japanese financial institutions experienced a severe
blow due to the delay of UK's supervisory authorities. Compared to the U.S. where legal
systems such as the International Banking Act of 1978 and the Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991 are established, Japan is extremely retarded in dealing with
foreign banks activities in the nation. See Japanese Banking Act, art. 47.
235. See Court Decision, supra note 9, at 10.
236. Id.
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which shook the world.2 37 It was difficult for them to believe that the
MOF and Daiwa Bank, which had been operating in the United States for
many years, did not have knowledge of the thirty-day disclosure duty.
Even if the MOF and the Bank did not have knowledge of the law, it is
well-established in both Japan and the United States, that lack of
knowledge of the law does not disprove the existence of intent or mens
rea.238 Since the FRB's opinion was that the "MOF neither disclosed
important information nor honored the reporting duty between the bank
supervising authorities of the two countries" and that "[t]his was a breach
of faith,, 239 the expulsion of Daiwa Bank should be understood as an
indirect warning on the part of the FRB to the MOF.
The characteristics of the response of the MOF to the Daiwa Bank
incidents can best be described as obfuscation and delay, which is the
traditional technique of the MOF based on their governing principle:
"Never let them know; let them rely on us." 240  "Obfuscation" and
"delay" as well as "secrecy" are the key words often used these days in
criticizing the Japanese financial system.241  They are analogous to
"equivocation" and are taken as a kind of cover-up. All of these words
suggest not an attitude of clarifying the problem and solving it, but of an
attempt to make the status and magnitude of the problem fuzzier, which
is a typical form of "responsibility evasion.
242
This secrecy-prone administrative technique by the MOF had
237. Id.
238. "Ignorance of the law excuses no one (Ignorantia legis neminem excusat)" is one
of the basic principles of the common law in the United States. In other word, everyone
must know the ordinary laws of the country in which one lives, and ignorance therefore
does not excuse oneself from being charged with either civil or criminal liability. The
same principle applies to the citizens of Japan. See Criminal Code, Law No. 45 of 1906,
art.38-3.
239. MOF's Failures are Regrettable, NIHON KEIZAI SIMBUN, Nov. 29, 1995, at 2.
240. Diet Record No. 153 (Justice Committee), Nov. 28, 2001, at http://www.shugiin.
go.jp/ itdb.kaigiroku.nsf/html/ kaigiroku/000415320011128014.htm.
241. Shigeo Nakao, Globalization to be Reconsidered, at http://koho.osaka-
cu.ac.jp/vuniv2002/nakao2002/nakao2002-10.html.
242. Another example that is causing criticisms against the MOF from this
perspective is the "Jusen" problem. Although MOF claims that the interest-free
preferential credits of Japanese banks against Specialized Housing Finance Companies
(Jusen) is ¥40 trillion, the actual figure is rumored to be Y70 trillion. The U.S. authorities
are irritated that MOF is not disclosing information in a straightforward manner and have
the impression that MOF is engaged in a cover up, as in the Daiwa Bank case. See
Nippon Island of Bad Debts, SHUKAN Toyo KEIZAI, Feb. 24, 1996, at 12-17. For
"Jusen," see Mitsuru Misawa, Lenders' Liability in the Japanese Financial Market; A
case of 'Jusen, 'the largest problem loan in Japan, Part I, MANAGEMENT JAPAN, Autumn
1997, 18-28; Mitsuru Misawa, Lenders' Liability in the Japanese Financial Market; A
case of 'Jusen, ' the largest problem loan in Japan, Part II, MANAGEMENT JAPAN, Spring
1998, 18-28.
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severely damaged the international credibility of Japan.243 Nevertheless,
the MOF insisted that this problem was created by the "difference of
culture between Japan and the [United States]," 244 and did not accept its
fault, which was really the crux of the problem. 245 Such denial was
similar to the fact that the management of Daiwa Bank did not realize its
duty to disclose the important information at the earliest opportunity.
However, a "difference of culture" cannot be used to rationalize
negligence with regard to rules and violations. International business is
conducted under a certain set of rules and develops when mutual trust
deepens as agreements and contracts are exchanged and honored. It
became quite clear that there is a marked difference between Japan and
the United States in the understanding of this principle. The violation of
the reporting duty is a clear violation of a rule. The MOF clearly showed
how selfish the Japanese financial system was and how difficult it was
for the system to be accepted internationally. In that sense, the "Daiwa
Bank problem" was a "Japanese" problem as well.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is essential to have open
communication and tight cooperation among countries in order to
maintain an international financial system. In an age of progressively
globalized finances, where money can be transferred within a split
second, mistrust between financial supervisory authorities may lead to a
financial crisis. We have to conclude that the MOF's understanding of
this point was too naive.
The root of this case was the collaboration between the MOF and
the Japanese Banking industry regarding the so-called "administrative
guidance," which was indistinct and secretive.246 Such an administrative
method delayed healing and worsened the damage. When it became
impossible to hold back the information any more, and the truth was
finally made public, a huge irrevocable international and domestic loss of
trust resulted. Why then did the Japanese financial industry depend on
the "administrative guidance" of the secret room? Why did it not want to
act and take responsibility for its own acts?
The first reason is that, since the end of World War II, there have
not been clear rules established for the financial world in Japan under
which it could act on its own operating principles and take responsibility
243. See supra note 8.
244. At a press conference held on September 18, 1995 for foreign correspondents in
Japan, MOF explained that "the problem resided in the difference of culture." See
Suggestions of Splitting MOF Surfaced Abruptly with Daiwa Bank Scandal; MOF
Campaign of Bureaucracy, Shows Sign of Fatigue, SHUKAN ToYo KEZAI, Dec. 2, 1995, at
16 [hereinafter Suggestions of Splitting MOF Surfaced Abruptly].
245. See supra note 7.
246. Seichro Saito, Daiwa Bank Case and MOF, available at http://www.mmjp.or.jp/
news.
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247for its own activities. Rather, it had to adhere to the murky rules of
"administrative guidance," whereby it was required to ask the intentions
of the MOF.2 48 In this case, for example, there was no explicit rule
stating that the Bank had to report within a specific number of days after
it learned about such an incident. There was simply a guiding principle
that it had to be reported as soon as possible.
Secondly, the reason that such a secretive collaboration between the
administration and the industry, and its lack of disclosure, lasted so long
were the existence of the so-called "convoy system." 249-a concept to
approve the government backup system as a desirable matter-and the
increase in real-estate and stock prices that continued to rise for years
and years due to the continuous expansion of the Japanese economy.
25 °
Under such conditions, it was easier for industry to obey administration
policy, as the profit would automatically flow in with the expansion of
the Japanese economy. 251 Even if industry officials made a mistake in
managing the Bank, the damage would be healed automatically by the
rise of the real-estate and stock market prices if they "kept their mouths
shut" and acted in collaboration with the administration.252
Thirdly, from the international viewpoint, the Japanese financial
institutions, despite their limited international experience, had quickly
become giants in size during the last ten years, mainly because of a sharp
yen appreciation against the U.S. dollar.253  Their holding increased
twofold in terms of the dollar, and the amount of funds they controlled
increased sharply.254 Thus, the Japanese financial institutions, big in
size, but rather primitive in international etiquette, felt that they had to
depend on the administration's guidance in order to compete amongst the
more sophisticated institutions of the world,255 which, in comparison,
have survived years of tough competition and merger battles while being
responsible for their own acts.256 The MOF's shallow understanding of
what the international financial system should be was the true cause of
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See supra note 4.
250. Then Prime Minister Hashimoto's Report on MOF's Misadministration to the
Diet, February 5, 1998, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hasimotosouri/speech/1998/
0209soriokura.html.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See MOF's Confusion at its Peak: Distrust of Japan's Financial Administration
Heightens Regarding Daiwa Bank Scandal: Disbanding of MOF is Suggested, SHUKAN
Toyo KEizAI, Dec 2, 1995, at 16 [hereinafter MOF's Confusion at its Peak].
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See John Bussey, Japan's Bungling Ministry of Finance, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
1995, at A14.
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the joint failure of the MOF, on whom Daiwa Bank relied for guidance,
and Daiwa Bank to comply with U.S. law.
257
Nonetheless, the court's decision declared that there was no
evidence to prove that the MOF instructed or ordered DI et al. not to
report to the U.S. authorities and that it was inexcusable that they chose
not to make any decision on their own, relying solely on the MOF's
judgment or support. 8
Judging from the contents of their meeting with the Director-
General of the Banking Bureau of the MOF, it was unclear whether MOF
requested D, et al. to delay not only the disclosure timing, but also the
report to the U.S. authorities. 259  Therefore, in order to deny their
responsibilities, it was necessary to prove the specific request of the
MOF officers.26° Moreover, even if the MOF's request was made clear,
it alone could not deny their responsibilities. Even if they received such
a request, their illegal action in view of the U.S. laws would not be
tolerated unless they were forced to do so under a certain law.26' If ever
their responsibilities had to be removed, it had to be proven that a very
unusual situation existed where they had no choice but to obey MOF's
instruction.
B. Responsibility for Establishing Internal Control System
1. Responsibility of Establishment
The court stated that directors of a corporation were generally
responsible for establishing a risk control system and a law-abiding
system, an internal control system, and decided that the directors of the
case were responsible under Article 266, Section 1-5 because the system
was inadequate.262 The court also decided that the auditors were
responsible because they failed to monitor the system properly.263 The
decision established precedence, as there had been no prior decision that
had made such an explicit statement.
No one could deny that risk management and law-abiding
operations were extremely important in present day corporations,
particularly financial institutions. In addition, it was no secret that
directors were responsible for supervising those operations. However, as
257. Id.
258. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 31.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 45.
261. Id.
262. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 31.
263. Id.
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the court pointed out, it was impossible for directors to guide and
supervise all employees directly in large organizations. Consequently,
the directors' responsibilities of care were to establish risk management
and law abiding systems for employees and monitor them.264 Theories
have recognized such responsibilities for many years. 265 Establishment
of the system was a fundamental part of the company management,266 so
that its outline needed to be formalized in the board room.
267
Representative directors and directors in charge of operations were
responsible for establishing such a system, while other directors were
responsible for monitoring the system.E68
For a financial institution such as Daiwa Bank, establishment of
such an internal control system was particularly important and
constituted a part of the basic responsibilities of a director. It was written
clearly in the financial inspection manual of the Financial Services
Agency 269 formulated in 1999 and it was self-evident that whether an
internal control system concerning risk management and a compliance
system was established, was the main objective of the financial
inspection by the Financial Services Agency.
270
However, it also must be realized that since such an internal control
system had been introduced recently, it was not appropriate to judge the
responsibilities of a director required at the time when the incident
occurred with the level of internal control system currently required.
One also should have considered the discretionary power given to a
director as a management judgment issue. Nonetheless, even though it
was not clearly recognized as an issue of establishing an internal control
system, a risk management system or a law-abidance system per se, 271 it
was fair to say that some of their concepts were part of a director's
responsibility of care, especially as a part of the monitoring
responsibility. Although the issue was related to the discretionary power
264. Id.
265. See KENICHI YOSHIMOTO, SHoun HOuMu [COMMERCIAL LAW] 1562, 40-42.
266. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 11.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. The Financial Reconstruction Committee (FRC) was merged into the Financial
Services Agency on January 6, 2001. The FRC had been working to restore stability and
vitality in the financial system through the quick resolution of failed financial institutions
under the Financial Revitalization Law and capital injection into viable institutions using
public funds under the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law. Law No. 143
(1998). With these efforts, the environment surrounding financial institutions had on the
whole regained stability. For details, see http://www.fsa.go.jp.
270. See Check List for Inspection of Law Abidance System and Check List for
Inspection of Risk Management System, KNYU KENSAI MANYUARU [FINANCIAL
INSPECTION MANUAL], July 1999.
271. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 34.
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of a director, limits existed with such power, as can be seen from the
status of a compliance system that was a target of a financial inspection.
Part of the order for filing an improvement plan or a business stop order
was issued according to the Japanese Banking Law272 if the status was
poor. This rule also applied to any corporation other than financial
institutions, although the degree of severity might have varied by
industry.
2. Responsibility of Care
If it is assumed that all agree on the notion that directors were
responsible for establishing an internal control system, the next question
is whether it was reasonable to seek the defendants' violations of specific
duties related to the care in this regard as the court did.
The plaintiffs claimed the lack of separation between the securities
trading department and the fund settlement/administration department, as
well as an inadequate forced holiday system, as the problems with the
risk management system of Daiwa Bank's New York office.273 These
points claimed by the plaintiffs are certainly the check items for risk
management found in the financial inspection manual.2 74 However, the
court rejected all of these claims, except the claim pointing to the
inadequacy of the routine to check the storage balance of actual T-
bills.
275
It was true that Iguchi's unauthorized transactions could have been
exposed much earlier if such a check on actual T-bills was implemented.
However, a more careful examination should have been made as to the
legal evaluation whether the lack of confirmations of actual T-bills was
extremely inadequate or not.
The defendants rebutted that the inspection method for checking the
securities in storage by means of storage balance statements normally
used by other banks and auditing firms,276 while the method of checking
the storage balance by usually viewing actual T-bills at the secondary
277storage site was not necessarily used, even at that time. It was true that
the fact that the same method that was used by other financial institutions
could not be used as a basis for arguing that the particular inspection
method was not inadequate, if the method was grossly deficient.278
However, one cannot deny the fact that the actual method practiced by
272. Japanese Banking Law, Law No. 21 of 1927, art. 26.
273. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 8.
274. Supra note 270.
275. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 34.
276. Id. at 10-13.
277. Id. at 39-40.
278. Id.
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other Japanese bank branches and U.S. banks in New York could be used
as a reference in judging whether the particular inspection method was
grossly deficient or not. In that sense, the fact that, while the particular
New York branch had been audited by an auditing company, inspected
by both the Japanese and U.S. banking supervisory authorities, and had
been subjected to internal auditing by the bank's internal American
auditor, it was never demonstrated that there was any deficiency in the
method of storage balance confirmation. This means that there was a
possibility that all the U.S. and Japanese financial inspectors did not
consider it a deficient method. One could not adopt today's level of risk
management system as the basis for assessing the case. In addition, the
level of risk management involved is a factor of management judgment,
so that there would be room for a manager's discretionary power.
Although the fact that there was no physical confirmation of actual T-
bills, it may be considered a material deficiency of the risk control
system at that time. Once the public knew what had transpired, it left a
question in everyone's mind as to whether it was indeed such a severe
deficiency at the time of the incident.
3. Principle of Trusting Right
The persons who were accused of job-related negligence concerning
the establishment of the risk control system in the case A were the three
directors D2, D 6 and D8, all of whom had served as New York branch
managers, 279 and who were accused of inadequacies in the method of
confirming the storage balance of T-bills 280 and the auditor, D33,who
visited New York branch in September 1993 for auditing, but failed to
correct the method of confirming the storage balance of T-bills, although
he could have found that it was inadequate. 281 As to D1, who was the
president, and D 3, who was the vice president, they were not accused of
negligence of supervisory responsibilities on the ground that they were
allowed to delegate their responsibilities to directors in charge of the
inspection department, which was responsible for inspecting the storage
balance of T-bills, and the directors in charge of the New York branch.282
The corporate organization was structured in such a way that the
president and the vice president were found not to have supervisory
responsibilities, unless there were special circumstances that raised
doubts about the job performance of those directors who had the
279. Id. at 39-41.
280. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 39-41.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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frontline responsibilities. 283 For the same reasons, other directors were
also discharged of their supervisory responsibilities unless there were
special circumstances that created doubts of adequate job performance.284
Such a thought in the court decision at that time was assumed to
have its ground in the principle of "trusting right," whereby directors and
auditors could delegate portions of their jobs to other directors and
auditors, or employees, and the directors were allowed to assume that
there were no problems in the delegated jobs unless there were special
circumstances that created doubt about adequate job performance.285
Such a theory also could be found among Japanese academic circles.286
There was no question that directors could not do everything on
their own in such a large company and that they had to delegate some of
the work load to other directors in charge of special areas or employees.
That was the reason why various internal organizations existed.287 It also
was difficult for a director to monitor the details of the work performed
by the people to whom the director had delegated his/her work.28 8 This
idea has been wildly accepted in the United States and is called "Trusting
Right., 289 Such a protection in the U.S. was given to a director, however,
only when the trust was reasonable and the individual worthy. In other
words, the director could trustingly accept reports from a person whom
he/she has delegated work without feeling the need to investigate them,
except under special circumstances. 2
90
The question then becomes, what kind of a circumstance would be
considered a special case, and was a system established to enable the
director to trust the person in charge. It was unrealistic to expect a
director, who did not have the frontline responsibilities to perform such a
detailed task, to check the storage balance report by visually checking the
actual T-bills.291 The author considers that the court decision to accept
"trusting rights" therefore was appropriate.
VII. Responsibility of Information Disclosure
Despite the fact that Daiwa Bank learned of a huge loss due to
Iguchi's unauthorized dealings, it issued 50 million shares of preferred
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 39-41.
286. KATSUO KANZAKi, HANHYO SHouJI HouMu [COMMERCIAL LAW], 1492, 76-78.
287. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 39-47.
288. Id.
289. A.L.I., Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations,
§ 4.02.
290. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 41.
291. Id.
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stocks on July 27, 1995 .292 If this is considered to be an act of deceiving
shareholders, its directors could be indicted for criminal and civil
responsibilities under the Japanese Securities Exchange Law.293 This
point is not a count of this suit and there were no claims in this
shareholders' derivative action as to this point.294 However, this should
not be overlooked.
Although they knew about the huge loss described above, the
management of Daiwa Bank delayed disclosure of that information to the
FRB for a substantial period.295 The FRB thought that this delay was a
serious violation of the reporting rule under the IBA.296  In addition,
Daiwa Bank may have been required to disclose this important
information, which logically is expected to influence the securities
market for stockholders as well as to the public, which includes other
stakeholders.297 While this is not the direct concern of the FRB, if the
management of Daiwa Bank felt it had responsibility to the stockholders
to disclose, it should have reported such information to the United States
and Japanese authorities at the appropriate time. From this standpoint,
whether the bank and its directors were obligated to disclose such
information to the stockholders is deeply related to the reporting duty to
the FRB. Furthermore, the Bank and its directors may have been
responsible for the disclosure of important information under the
Securities and Exchange Law of Japan, as Daiwa Bank's stock was
traded on Japan's stock market.
298
292. Id. at 30.
293. The Securities and Exchange Law of Japan also prohibits fraudulent operations
with Article 58 against illegal trading which corresponds to Article 17(a) of U.S.
Securities Act of 1933 and against manipulation of the stock market with Article 125
which corresponds to Article 9 of U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The difference
between Article 58 and Article 125 is that Article 58 is a comprehensive prohibition rule
to prohibit all fraudulent actions in general while Article 125 is intended to secure a free
and open market. Due to the nature of these two rules, it often happens that a case
violates Article 125 and Article 58 at the same time.
294. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 4-8.
295. A wide range of international observers desires the necessity for disclosure by
Japanese banks. For example, Kevin Mellyrin, a consultant, and Arthur M. Mitchell, a
lawyer, claimed that "[I]f Japan wants to develop world-class financial institutions that
are necessary to secure its position in the world economy, it is necessary for Japan to ask
for a more thorough and consistent disclosure practice from its bank." Self-Renovation of
Japanese Banks Desired Urgently, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMnUN, Dec. 4, 1995, at 23.
296. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 43.
297. Mechanisms for Management Information Disclosure Suggestions to be Installed
in Daiwa Bank by Year End, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Oct. 13, 1995, at 7 [hereinafter
Mechanisms for Management Information Disclosure Suggestions].
298. If Daiwa Banks stocks were traded on the U.S. market, or if Daiwa Bank had
been issuing its securities in the United States, so that there were stockholders in the
United States, then the U.S. Securities Acts would have been applied. However, this was
not the case.
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What is notable here is that Daiwa Bank asked a third party to
purchase its stock without disclosing the losses, thus causing damage to
this third party. Daiwa Bank issued 50 million shares of preferred stock
on July 27, 1995.299 Asahi Mutual Life Insurance Co. (Asahi Seimei), a
major life insurance company in Japan,3 00 bought a large sum of Daiwa
Banks common stocks shortly before the incident was disclosed.3 1
Asahi Seimei commented later that Athe stock purchase was made on the
request of Daiwa and it was regretful that the loss disclosure was not
made.3 °2
The facts of this case reveal that a "director of Daiwa Bank urged
Asahi Seimei to buy Daiwa Bank's stock from the open market without
disclosing an important piece of information regarding Daiwa Bank that
might affect the market negatively., 30 3 Asahi Seimei already owned 2.7
million shares of Daiwa Bank stock at that point. 30 4  Asahi Seimei
decided, however, that additional shares would be helpful to enhance its
business in the Kansai District, where Daiwa Bank had its head office,
and thus, bought a total of five million shares in six installments between
late August and late September 1995, immediately before the disclosure
of this incident.30 5 During this period, Daiwa Bank shares traded at
slightly over 800 yen per share. The price subsequently dropped to about
600 yen per share, causing the insurance company to incur an unrealized
loss of Y650 million (about $6.5 million).30 6
The next question to be examined is whether Daiwa Bank had a
duty to disclose this important information to stockholders, including
Asahi Seimei, according to the Securities and Exchange Law of Japan.
When a director discloses an important piece of information about a
company, he or she may either disclose it or make the company disclose
it. In either case, the director must always choose between the following
duties: (1) the duty owed to stockholders to disclose the information as
299. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 30.
300. At that time, the fifth largest life insurance company in Japan.
301. Daiwa Bank's Huge Loss Case, Disclosure Tardiness Undeniable: Finding of
Preferred Stock Issuance After Former Bank Employee 's Confession Causes Distrust in
Domestic and Overseas Markets, NiHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 29, 1995, at 3
[hereinafter Daiwa Bank's Huge Loss Case].
302. Id. Although a company is now allowed to own its own stocks in the form of
Treasury Stocks in Japan as it is so in the U.S., it was forbidden to do so in Japan.
Commercial Code, Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 210. Therefore, when a company wanted to
ask the third party to obtain the company's stock or increase the number of stocks the
third party owns, it was a common practice in Japan to ask the third party to purchase the
company's stocks through the stock market. Id.
303. Daiwa Bank's Huge Loss Case, supra note 301.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
[Vol. 24:1
2005] SHAREHOLDERS' ACTION AND DIRECTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY 45
soon as possible; 30 7 and (2) the duty owed to the company not to disclose
any information without first investigating thoroughly the accuracy of
the information.30 8 In some cases, this choice can be extremely difficult.
While the director did not sell the stock he owned to Asahi Seimei,
Seimei would not have purchased Daiwa Bank stock if it had known of
the negative information. 30 9 Therefore, as far as the director's duty of
disclosure is concerned, it is reasonable to assume that the case is similar
to the director's selling of his own stock to another stockholder without
disclosing the negative information. The Asahi Seimei case illustrates
the difference in director's duties under United States and Japanese law.
The disclosure duty under the common law in United States is as
follows: For liability to occur: (1) a party involved in a business
transaction must intentionally prevent another party from obtaining an
important piece of information by concealment or otherwise; 310 or (2) a
party must owe to another party a duty "to exercise reasonable care to
disclose matters known to him that the other party is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them." 311 Otherwise, a party cannot be sued for fraud based on
its failure to disclose information. As for the fiduciary, however, the
party not only has an "affirmative duty of utmost good faith, and full and
fair disclosure of all material facts," but also has an affirmative duty to
"employ reasonable care to avoid misleading his clients. 312
Under U.S. case law, it has been discussed extensively whether a
fiduciary relationship exists between a director and a stockholder.313 It is
clear that such a fiduciary relationship does exist between a director and
a stockholder when a director buys the company's stock from a
stockholder and takes advantage of knowledge of internal information of
the company.31 4 Similarly, there exists the question of whether or not
Daiwa Bank had a disclosure duty with regard to Asahi Seimei, a
stockholder, in urging Asahi Seimei to buy shares from the market.
307. See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 368, 45 S. E. 232, 234 (1903); Cady, Robers
& Co., SEC 907, 911 (1961); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F. 2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966)
(discussing U.S. common law); see Court Decision, supra note 9, at 15 and 31
(discussing this case).
308. Court Decision, supra note 9, at 15 and 31.
309. Id. at 30.
310. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1976).
311. Id. at§ 551(2)(a).
312. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). In
equity law, fraud includes all actions, omissions, and concealment that cause damages to
other people, with violations of duties, trusts, or confidence duly placed under the
common law or the equity law, or all actions, omissions or concealment to deprive other
people inappropriately and unconscientiously of opportunities to make profits.
313. Speed v. Transamerica Corp. (I), 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947).
314. Id.
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
The "majority" rule is that, "officers and directors do not have
active liabilities for disclosure responsibilities unless misstatement,
unclear representation, or intentional concealment were made either
verbally or by actions.315 However, since they have fiduciary obligations
to the company and the stockholders with regard to trading with the
company and for the company, they have the disclosure duties.' 316
According to this rule, it is fair to conclude that the directors of Daiwa
Bank had a disclosure duty in the Asahi Seimei case.
The "minority" rule states that "the insider (officers, directors, and
majority shareholders owning more than 10% of the stocks) of a
company is construed to have a fiduciary relation with a stockholder in a
stock trading so that the former has to make a complete disclosure on all
important matters. '317 Based on this standpoint, there is no question that
a disclosure duty exists for those Daiwa Bank directors in the Asahi
Seimei case.318
Against this backdrop of U.S. common law, the securities laws319
contain several prohibitive rules against fraudulent activities. In
particular, they deem illegal an "insider's" use of insider information in
trading securities.32 °  Specifically, Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 obligates certain insiders, namely officers,
directors, and major stockholders, to pay the company any profit they
earned due to insider information within the past six months. 321 Whether
such an action is to be construed as "insider trading" is judged according
315. The leading case for this view is Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1868).
316. Id.
317. Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234-35 (1903); Stewart v. Harris. 77 P. 277, 279
(1904); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 155 S.E.2d 601, 605-06 (1967).
318. A third theory on this matter is an intermediate position in that it states that an
insider owes a responsibility for non-disclosure in special circumstances. Even from this
standpoint, the disclosure duty of Daiwa Bank is undeniable. See Strong v. Repide, 213
U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (discussing a third theory). The court held that the purchase of
stocks from minor stockholders by a dominant stockholder and administrative general
without disclosing the pending sale of a company asset, constituted an unlawful fraud. Its
decision was based on its finding that it was the defendants' duties to act honestly and
disclose the facts prior to the purchase, given the defendants' positions as insiders and
the special knowledge they had. Id.
319. Unites States Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78mm (1934) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a B 78jj (1934). The Act of 1933 was
intended to achieve "truth in securities" related to the public offerings in the issuing
market, while the Act of 1934 intends mainly to control offerings in the issuing markets,
while the Act of 1934 intends mainly to control activities of brokers and dealers a well as
the securities market where they operate; at the same time, it established a disclosure
system (Securities Report System) that obligates them to disclose pertinent information
continuously.
320. Louis Loss, SECuRrrIEs REGULATION, 1445-1473 (1961).
321. Id.
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to Rule 1Ob-5, a derivative rule of Section 10(b).322
It is difficult to believe that the insiders of Daiwa Bank did not trade
Daiwa Bank's stock at all while important information was being
withheld. If there were any such trading, Rule 1Ob-5 should be applied
in the U.S. The directors of Daiwa Bank must have had the choice
"either to disclose the important information or to abstain from
trading. 3 23 It must have been the same in the case of asking Asahi
Seimei to buy Daiwa Bank's stock from the market. The particular
director of Daiwa Bank must have had the choice "either to disclose or
not to ask for such a trade."
324
In the United States, the disclosure duty, according to Rule 1 Ob-5, is
not limited to the case of a direct deal between an insider and a
stockholder, 325 but rather it imposes a wider duty on insiders to urge the
company to disclose fully any important information that might influence
the evaluation of the stock of the company on the stock market. 326 It
seems that, although the responsibility of disclosure by the company is
stressed, the company's response is generally slow and limited by its
pursuit of its own interests. Thus, the responsibility of disclosing to the
general public seems to fall on the insiders themselves.
There is no question that insiders will be charged with violations of
1Ob-5 for distributing false information through reports, newspaper
releases, comments by directors, or any other methods, even if they were
not involved in any trading.327 The question, however, is whether or not
they will be convicted of violating Rule lOb-5 when they fail to
announce an important piece of information that most likely would have
affected the market price.328 There is no Supreme Court case that deals
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Daiwa Bank's Huge Loss Case, supra note 301.
326. Id.
327. In the Texas Gulf Sulpher case, where the focus of the lawsuit was a misleading
newspaper report describing a large mineral deposit found in Canada as uncompromising,
the Second Circuit Court stated in its final judgment that it seems that it is not unfair to
hold the management of a company to be responsible to confirm the accuracy of any
announcements the company makes to stockholders or the general public. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulpher Co, 401 F.2d 833, 861-6 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.. Coates v.
SEC and Kline v. SEC. 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In other words, the court delivered a
judgment that rule 1Ob-5 is always considered to be violated in a case such as follows:
when an announcement was made in a rationally calculated method in order to influence
the investing public, e.g. by media reporting financial status, and said announcement was
fraudulent or likely to cause misunderstanding or, so imperfect as to cause
misunderstanding irrespective of whether the announcement was motivated by secret
purpose of the officers of the company or not.
328. Loss, supra note 320.
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with this particular issue. Both the SEC 3 29 and the U.S. courts330
consider it appropriate to temporarily withhold an important piece of
information from the market if there is a sufficient business reason to do
so. During this period, when the information is withheld, neither the
issuer nor the insiders may conduct trading. If this concept is applied to
the Asahi Seimei case, Daiwa Bank's (or its directors') request that the
third party purchase the Bank's stock is equivalent to doing the trading
by itself, and thus, a court is likely to find that it is not possible to
conduct such trading legally while withholding such information for a
substantial period of time.
Accordingly, leading stock exchanges in the United States request
listed companies to release quickly to the public any news or information
which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for
its securities and to "act promptly to dispel unfounded rumors which
result in unusual market activity or price variations.,
331
Taking these rules and regulations in the United States as the
premise, the Asahi Seimei case, in which a director of Daiwa Bank asked,
and actually made, the third party buy the Bank's shares, though
acquired in the stock market, can be considered a violation of the law
because of its similarity to the case where an insider would be involved
in the transaction itself. In this case, the insider was obligated to disclose
the important information known to him because of his position, but
unknown to the other party, which would have affected the other party's
investment judgment.332 In such a case, a clash is inevitable between the
Rule 1 Ob-5 duty of a director to disclose important information as soon
as possible and the duty of a director under the common law not to
disclose information prematurely. 333 If disclosure prior to the buying or
selling is inappropriate or unrealistic, then the only choice left is to give
up trading. Moreover, if it is proven that the director not only failed to
disclose such important information, but also intentionally concealed it,
there is a possibility that he would be accused of violating both the
general fraud prohibition provision, Section 9(a)(4), which prohibits
market manipulation, and Rule 1 Ob-5 .
The present case, however, appears entirely different under
Japanese law. It is difficult under Japanese law to establish a complaint
against Daiwa Bank and its directors as to the non-disclosure of the
important information. Although disclosing fraudulent information is an
329. Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 646 (1971).
330. Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1971).
331. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual 202.05 (April 8, 2004).
332. Loss, supra note 320.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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offense under Japanese law as well, failure to disclose information that
would affect the stock price is not an offense.
Based on the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities and Exchange Law335 of Japan
contains a detailed rule on disclosures by corporations. The Securities
Exchange Law of Japan is intended to protect past and future investors in
corporations by focusing on the disclosure system.336  While rules of
investor protection existed in the Commercial Code, they did not
sufficiently cover the disclosure of corporate accounting.337 Therefore,
the Securities and Exchange Law was introduced as a supplement to
secure smooth and fair-trading of securities, as well as to protect
investors.3 38
Like Rule lOb-5 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1934, Japanese law
also prohibits insider trading. However, if an insider owns the stock of
his own company under the name of a third party or a fictitious person,
voluntary reporting will probably be meaningless.339 In addition to the
fact that it is practically impossible to detect the violation, the stipulation
that the director who benefited from the insider trading must return the
resulting profit to the company, makes it difficult to expect any
significant effects, given the social custom of Japan, unless there is an
internal power struggle within management.340 Consequently, it is less
seldom that this Japanese insider-trading rule is activated.
335. Shoken Torihiki Ho (Securities and Exchange Law), Law No. 25 of 1948,
[translated in 3 INT'L SEC. REG. JAPAN BOOKLET 2, at 14 (1992) [hereinafter Securities
and Exchange Law]. Subsequent amendments to this law reflected developments in the
Untied States. The occupation authorities enacted the Securities and Exchange Law at
the end of the Second World War as a condition of the reopening of the securities
exchange market in Japan.
336. ICHIRO KAWAMOTO AND KAsuNAMI OHTAKE, SHOKEN TORiHIKIHO [THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE LAW], 34-35 (1996).
337. The Commercial Code Law No. 48 of 1899 was modeled after German laws,
while the Securities and Exchange Law was copied from the U.S. laws after World War
II. Germany is a civil law country, while the United States is a country of the common
law. Any confusion in the concept of disclosure in Japan may be attributed to the slight
difference in the disclosure rules of the two source countries. For an examination of the
development of the Japanese securities market, see Mitsuru Misawa, Securities
Regulation in Japan. 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 447 (1973). Further, as to the
internationalization of the Tokyo Stock Market, see Mitsuru Misawa, Tokyo as an
International Capital Market B It's Economic and Legal Aspects, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1 (1974). It is safe to say that when the loyalty of employees to the company is
compared to their loyalty to their stockholders, the latter is given priority. The loyalty to
the company not to disclose prematurely is a part of the traditional social system in Japan
and the lifetime employment system goes hand in hand with this loyalty. This loyalty
given by directors and employees to the company is one of the basic principles of the
Commercial Code of Japan.
338. Id.
339. KAWAMOTO, supra note 336.
340. Id.
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As a result, the question of whether or not a director of a company
has a duty to inform the other party about inside information when
trading his or her own company stocks has been met generally with a
negative answer. In fact, except in a clear case of fraud, the contract will
not be negated. A director will not be obligated to indemnify the other
party just because the director failed to disclose a piece of inside
information about the company that the director came to know in the
course of his or her work, unless the other party asked the director to
disclose such information. Moreover, a director will not be held legally
accountable for his or her company's nonfeasance in failing to disclose
important information, even if it was information that could be
reasonably expected to have a substantial influence on the securities
market according to this rule. 34 1 Therefore, it is impossible to label the
responsibility of any particular director for non-disclosure of the
information in the Asahi Seimei case as a violation of Section 189 of the
Securities and Exchange Law of Japan, which corresponds to Rule 1Ob-5
of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934.342
Even in Japan, however, the situation would be different if a person
is actively involved in concealing information, in addition to delaying its
disclosure.34 3 Although it is difficult to seek punishment based on
violation of the Insider Trading Prohibition, Article 189 of the Securities
and Exchange Law of Japan, as those cases in the United States 344 are not
established in Japan, such action can probably be prosecuted as an illegal
transaction that violates the general fraud rule.345
In essence, one must conclude that it is difficult to hold a director in
Japan legally accountable in these cases, unless the failure to disclose
important information is accompanied with some fraudulent action, such
as concealment. While numerous investors, in addition to Asahi Seimei,
must have brought Daiwa Bank's stock prior to the disclosure of the
341. The disclosure of important information based on the request of the stock
exchange also is not uncommon in Japan as a follow-up procedure of information already
announced. After the incident was disclosed, the possibility of merger between Daiwa
Bank and Sumitoma Bank was rumored. In response to this, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
requested both banks to disclose information in writing, but both banks responded by
saying that "there is no specific merger plan." Chairman of Tokyo Stock Exchange Asks
for Disclosure if any Changes Exist in Sumitoma Bank and Daiwa Bank Merger, NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 22, 1995, at 4. The Tokyo Stock Exchange further asked both
banks to "disclose information as quickly as possible if any changes occur, since the
merger was expected to affect the stock prices." Id.
342. See MOF's Confusion at its Peak, supra note 253.
343. See surpa text accompanying note 295.
344. Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 646 (1971); Dolgow v.
Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1971).
345. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
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incident and incurred damage due to the price drop of the stocks,346 there
is no legal remedy based on the Securities and Exchange Law of
Japan.347 The only way to obtain a remedy was to bring a derivative suit
under the Commercial Code,348 charging a violation of the duty of loyalty
of the directors to the company.
Although MOF did not comment on the case of Asahi Seimei's
purchase of the stocks, it commented on the issuance of preferred stocks
in Japan by Daiwa Bank immediately before the incident was disclosed,
saying, "there is no specific procedural problem in regard to the
Securities and Exchange Law.,
349
VIII. Effect of Court's Decision in 2002
This decision profoundly effected directors' responsibilities in
Japanese companies and how the shareholder's representative action
system should be. It resulted in an amendment350 of the Commercial
Code in December 2001 concerning corporate governance.351
(1) Abatement of Shareholder's Responsibility to Corporation;
Rationalization of Shareholder's Representative Action
1. Abatements of Responsibilities of Directors and Others to
Corporation
Although it had been ruled that the responsibility of a director to
its corporation cannot be removed without consent of the entire
shareholders, the new rule states that any portion that exceeds
four times the particular director's annual compensation could
be pardoned with a special voting decision of the shareholder's
346. No Procedural Fault in Issuing Preferred Stocks After Confession for Former
Employees, MOF's Vice Minister Asserts, NIHON KEIzAi SHIMBUN, Oct. 6, 1995, at 7.
347. As the result of the experience, Daiwa Bank installed an internal proposal
organization to promote the disclosure of the management information by the end of
1995. This was received as a progressive effort. In order to prevent any recurrence of
such an incident and to improve the transparency of the management, an organization
called "Action Direction Committee," a permanent proposition organization consisting of
outsiders was started. The committee members included owner/operators of other
companies, scholars, and professionals, journalists, and general saving customers,
totaling about ten people. The committee discussed and proposed ideas relating to the
issues of how to retain customers and corporate customers and how to provide more
informative communications to the stockholders. Mechanisms for Management
Information Disclosure Suggestions, supra note 297.
348. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
349. See MOF's Confusion at its Peak, supra note 253.
350. Enacted on December 5, 2001. Implemented on May 1, 2002.
351. See Japan Auditor's Association, Amendments of the Commercial Code, June 13,
2002, at arts. 4-5, 11-25, at http://www.kansa.or.jp/PDF/e103_kh14613.pdf. [hereinafter
Amended Commercial Code].
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meeting or a voting decision of the board of director's meeting
based on the rules of the article of association unless the
director failed to perform its duty conscientiously and there was
a material mistake on the director's part.352  However, the
ceiling amount is six years for a director with a representative
director and two years for an outside director or an auditor.
353
2. Abatement of Outside Director's Responsibility
It is permissible to have an agreement to limit the
responsibilities of an outside director in advance.354 However,
it is required, as a prerequisite condition, to establish a rule in
the article of association that a limited responsibility agreement
could be established.
355
(2) Rationalization of Shareholder's Representative Action
1. Extension of Consideration Period
The revised law extends the consideration period for a company
to decide whether to take legal action, when the shareholders
demand that the company take an action against its directors'
seeking their responsibilities, from the previous period of thirty
356days to sixty days. The intention behind the revision was to
provide a sufficient length of time for the auditors to investigate
whether such an action was needed.
357
2. Revision Concerning Public Announcement and Notice to
Shareholders
The revised law requires a company to make a public
announcement and notify its shareholders without delay when it
takes a legal action against its directors seeking their
responsibilities or when the company received a notice of a
shareholder's representative action from the shareholders.
358
3. Improvement on Rules Concerning Amicable Settlement on
352. Amended Commercial Code, supra note 351, at arts. 266-7 B 266-11, 266-17 -
266-18.
353. Id.
354. Id. at arts. 266-19 - 266-23.
355. Id.
356. Id. at arts. 267-1 - 267-3.
357. Amended Commercial Code, supra note 351.
358. Id. at arts. 268-4.
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Action
The revised law allows a company to make an amicable
settlement with its defendant directors without consent from the
entire shareholders when it takes legal action against its
directors seeking their responsibilities.
359
4. Company's Assistance for Defendant Directors in
Shareholder's Representative Action
The revised law explicitly allows a company to participate in a
shareholder's representative action and assist defendant
directors, on the condition that an agreement from its entire
auditors is available, except in case of a small corporation
specified in the Special Case Law of the Commercial Code.
360
In September 2000, at the same time as the amendment to the
Commercial Code was passed, 36' and the Osaka District Court issued a
decision for a shareholder's representative action concerning a huge loss
of Daiwa Bank New York branch and ordering eleven directors to pay
damages in the total amount of ¥83 billion ($775 million), the defendants
gave up the right of appeal and sought a settlement for a joint payment of
Y250 million ($2.3 million).362
It was originally predicted that the case would go all the way up to
the Supreme Court, but it was said the parties involved agreed in an early
settlement.36 3 However, the value of this first trial as the leading case of
shareholder's representative actions in Japan was not tarnished by the
early settlement.3 6
IX. Conclusion
In all of the cases preceding the present case, directors'
responsibilities were recognized almost exclusively in cases where
directors were involved in malicious illegal acts themselves, while cases
of being charged with responsibilities of negligence were almost non-
existent, partially because the management decision principle was
admitted. None of those cases ended up with such a huge amount of
damages as in the Daiwa Bank case. Most cases ended up with
rejections or withdrawals for reasons of disobeying the pledge offering
359. Id. at arts. 268-5 - 268-7.
360. Id. at arts. 268-8.
361. Supra note 337.
362. AsAHI SHIMBUN, Dec. 12, 2001, at 11.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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orders, or dismissal of claims. In almost no circumstance could directors
be charged for responsibilities if they had conscientiously conducted
their jobs as long as the facts were studied carefully and the legal
principles were applied correctly. Thus, the present case, in which the
defendants were asked to pay a phenomenal amount of damages totaling
several tens of billions yen, just as a loss recovery, was an extremely
unusual case.
Although the case attracted the attention of many people, it is an
unusual case among precedents, so that it is not appropriate to discuss the
entire precedence of shareholders' representative actions and criticize the
shareholder's representative action system, based on this action alone.
However, the decision sounded a very important alarm about how
Japanese corporations are managed. The background that allowed
Japanese companies to be run loosely seems to be the fact that the
supervising authorities and the legal system failed to pursue the lack of
risk management and concealment of responsibilities rigorously. In this
case, Iguchi succeeded in hiding the location of the custody operation
from the MOF's inspection, thereby deceiving the inspector, but, to this
point it is unknown if the ministry has tried to punish MOF severely for
the oversight. Additionally, it is unknown if any severe punishment was
made, or responsibility was sought after, based on the Securities
Exchange Law in the case of the bank issuing preferred stocks,
concealing the unauthorized dealings. In Japan, lack of stem punishment
by the authorities, strictly according to the law, invites a lack of loose
risk management, negligent adherence to laws, and concealments of
illegal acts.365
As for the disclosure, there was a marked difference between the
United States and Japan regarding strictness in the pursuit of disclosure
duties of corporations. It was safe to say that an average Japanese
company did not feel a need to immediately disclose important
information until now. One lesson from the Daiwa Bank case is it is
important for Japanese banks to observe the disclosure principle more
stringently and to disclose pertinent operating information to
stakeholders, such as stockholders and corporate customers, earlier, more
quickly, more frequently, and more thoroughly, rather than reporting it
privately to authorities, such as the MOF. The more thoroughly Japanese
banks conduct disclosure, the higher their market valuations will be. By
assuming full and strict responsibility of management and supervision,
they will be able to regain the trust of the international securities market.
This lack of steness in the law enforcement system has created
sloppy risk managements and concealing attitudes among Japanese
365. MOF's Confusion at its Peak, supra note 253.
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companies, which resulted in the current case when one of such Japanese
companies operated in the U.S. with the same loose attitudes. In order to
prevent this kind of case, more rigorous attitudes are necessary to ensure
that directors are more responsible for their duties. That should provide
incentives to Japanese companies to establish effective risk management
and law-abidance systems. It is notable that shareholder's representative
actions finally have started to function as an effective means of law
enforcement in Japan.
The present case served to reveal the fact that it is extremely
dangerous for Japanese financial institutions to try to operate overseas
without mending their lack of risk managements and their sloppiness in
legal compliance. Japanese financial supervising authorities must also
accept this new mindset. Such an incident could invite international
mistrust in the Japanese society itself. The current status of the legal and
organizational systems of the Japanese financial supervising authorities
is not up to the level necessary to handle international financial
businesses.
Economic relations between Japan and the United States have been
turbulant in recent years due to the trade imbalance problem. Various
disagreements in thinking were exposed between the two countries in the
Daiwa Bank case. This incident provided a new and serious impact on
relations between the two countries. The central issue of this incident is
not that an employee of Daiwa Bank engaged in illegal operations, nor is
it the huge loss that those operations caused. Those things often occur in
both countries, and such a thing should not cause such a profound
impact. The real problems are that Daiwa Bank failed to report to U.S.
authorities, and that the Bank covered up its losses for an extended
period of time.
Moreover, the MOF failed to notify the U.S. authorities quickly
after it was contacted by the Bank. The fact that the Director-General of
the Banking Bureau, and other officials of the MOF, failed to report the
unauthorized transactions to the U.S. Financial Supervisory Authority,
was a material violation of the international agreement between banking
supervisory authorities of member countries. This surely triggered a
great mistrust of the Japanese officials in the minds of the officers the
U.S. Financial Supervisory Authority.
These delays are the reason why the United States is calling the
Japanese activities "a serious betrayal of the trust between the United
States and Japan. '366 A further problem is that the Japanese, including
the MOF, seem to lack any awareness that they may be at fault. "There
was no mishandling of the matter," said the MOF. "The reason the
366. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
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Americans are upset stems from the cultural difference between the two
countries. 367
This difference in perspective between the two countries makes this
case more complex and multifaceted. It includes an essential problem
that cannot be brushed away as a difference of culture. A wide
discrepancy exists between the two countries in the way in which the
laws regarding the disclosure system of corporate information are
applied. It is mandatory for U.S. corporate management to release, in a
timely manner, any information that might affect the market for the
securities. 368 However, it is quite different in Japan. It generally is
thought that a disclosure should be made at a carefully selected point.
Even the MOF agrees with this concept. This misconception between
the two countries was the largest factor causing this case and created the
difference in the perceptions of the seriousness of the matter. As a result
of that misconception, the handling of the matter by the Japanese was
criticized extensively.
Japanese industries should understand clearly that their legal
interpretations, as well as people's conceptions and manners of dealing
with various matters, while acceptable in Japan, may not necessarily be
correct in the United States. It is common sense that, as long as one
wishes to conduct business in the United States, one should obey the
rules of the Untied States. In Japan, we have our own version of the
saying, "When in Rome, do as the Romans do." This important
realization was missing from Daiwa Bank and the MOF.
Japanese companies operating overseas today are all confronted
with a question: to what extent should the Japanese way of thinking, i.e.
Japanese management style, be implanted into their overseas
subsidiaries.369  The backdrop to that dilemma is that, although the
Japanese management style was thought of highly at one time, more
criticisms of it are arising, especially in foreign countries, with the
demise of the Japanese economic boom.
370
The present case clearly shows how far it is possible to press the
Japanese way of thinking and way of handling matters overseas. It is a
great lesson, which teaches Japanese companies that there is a limit in
applying their management styles on foreign soils. This is especially true
367. See Suggestions of Splitting MOF Surfaced Abruptly, supra note 244.
368. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, 202.05 (April 8,
2004).
369. For the difference of the management styles, see Mitsuru Misawa, New
Japanese-Style Management in a Changing Era, COLUM J. WORLD Bus., Winter 1987, at
9.
370. For a recent criticism of Japanese management styles, see Mitsuru Misawa,
Portrait of the International Entrepreneurs [Interview with Japanese Business Leaders in
the United States], SEKAI SHuHo, Jan. 31, 1995, at 44-45 (1995).
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of Japanese companies, which are undergoing internationalization. It has
been nearly twenty years since the full-scale internationalization of
Japanese industries commenced. As international corporations, they
have done from being "infant industries," to now entering the age of
maturity. The present case is arguably something Japanese companies
were destined to experience as they mature into full-fledged
multinational corporations.
Because of this incident, Japanese banks are paying a hefty
intangible penalty, namely the loss of trust in the international market.
This penalty against Japanese banks will eventually be born by all
Japanese industries. It is necessary for Japanese industries to have a
positive attitude and accept these legal, economical, and social penalties,
and not try to resist them. Instead, these industries must learn the lessons
necessary for them to grow further and make a fresh start. It also is
necessary for Japan to rethink the relationship between the government
and industries, which has been taken for granted until now, and to make
necessary changes in its thinking. Restructuring the excessively large
government may be necessary.
The Japanese people must have the modesty to analyze this case
thoroughly through multiple approaches and learn whatever there is to be
learned. On the other hand, the American people should not repel Japan
simply by labeling them "different," but rather, understand better the
viewpoint of the Japanese people, and industries that are in the midst of a
process of internationalization. Americans should study how the
Japanese thought and reacted in this case and should try to understand
the Japanese legal, economical and sociological situations. The further
improvement of relations between these two countries will create a
consensus regarding international business between them through mutual
understanding. In that way, some consolation can be found in this
extremely regretful case. As is said in Japan, it is not impossible to turn
bad luck into good luck.

